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When Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh, the Thai Army Commander-in- 
Chief and the acting-Supreme Commander, quoted Qin Jiwei's statement that the 
cordial Sino-Thai relationship will "continue without end, regardless of the 
Kampuchean conflict or regional and global situations"1, he outlined future Thai 
security policy direction. Chaovalit's statement not only represents China's 
unilateral assurance of its security relationship with Thailand, but also the Thai 
military's intention of maintaining close security ties with Beijing at least in the 
near future.
The future Sino-Thai security relationship is not just determined by 
intentions of leaders of both countries to continue friendly ties, but is in fact a 
product of national interests shaped by both domestic politics and regional as well 
as the international environment. This sub-thesis is a study of the transformation 
and formation of the Thai-Chinese relationship changing from hostility to a 
strategic alignment. The emphasis is on Thailand's reasons and motivations in 
forging such a special relationship with China as well as problems and prospects 
for the future.
Chapter 1 examines why Thailand normalised its relations with China by 
delving into the change in Thai domestic politics as a result of the mass uprising in 
October 1973, the changing situation in Indochina, and the Sino-US 
rapprochement.
The study of the present state of Sino-Thai security relationship is 
discussed in chapter 2. Various factors such as the Vietnamese occupation of 
Kampuchea and the Vietnamese incursions into Thailand prompted Thailand to 
build security ties with China.
The attitudes of the Asean countries towards Thailand's relations with 
China are major factors taken into consideration by Bangkok in its current and 
future security relationship with Beijing. Chapter 3 is a study of Thailand’s
2dilemma with regard to the policy of maintaining special ties with China while 
limiting discontent within Asean.
Chapter 4 examines the major contemporary determinants which will 
strengthen Thai-Chinese security relations and the factors which are expected to 
be significant in the future. Prime Minister Chatichai's foreign policy and the 
military's modernisation programs, inter alia, are given particular attention.
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BANGKOK’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH BEIJING: AN 
ADJUSTMENT OF THAILAND'S SECURITY PERSPECTIVE
This chapter examines why Thailand normalised diplomatic relations with 
China after almost three decades of hostility. Two major questions are addressed 
to explain this adjustment in Thai policy:
1. Thailand's concern over the trans-Mekong region and land based 
threats from Vietnam;
2. the withdrawal of the US from Indochina and the search for a 
protector in China.
1. Thailand's Concern over the Trans-Mekong Region and Land 
Based Threat from Vietnam
Threat perceptions or perceptions of national security are products of a 
process involving various dimensions. This process involves a political and 
bureaucratic process or a "structural dimension"1 through which foreign policy is 
formulated. There are four main factors contributing to the formation of threat 
perceptions and concepts of national security. First, decision-makers themselves 
shape the concept of national security by influencing the formation of threat 
perceptions. Second, geopolitical character differentiates threat perceptions 
among states which have different geographical settings. For example, 
archipelago states are likely to regard their neighbours' maritime activities as a 
threat.2 A country like Thailand, which shares thousands of kilometres of 
common borders with its neighbours cannot help but feel vulnerable to land-based 
threats. Third, historical experience is another major dimension in the formation 
process of threat perceptions. Fourth, the socio-cultural dimension which 
comprises ethnic, religious and social values also influences threat perceptions. 
Malaysian and Indonesian attitudes towards China are affected by the presence of 
ethnic Chinese in their own countries, as well as by past experiences. These 
variables will, to varying degrees, influence the conceptualisation of threat 
perception and a state's view of its national security. Each state, like an 
individual, will "perceive phenomena with varying degrees of fidelity and
4distortion".3 A state, henceforth, will react and behave according to its perception 
of national security and will try to minimise those perceived threats.
Thai national security is a feeling of confidence that any activities related to 
Thailand's territorial integrity, its sovereignty, political system and any other 
national interests are free from threats.4 To put it more clearly, a threat to 
Thailand's national security is "any action that threatens its independence, the 
safety of its people and democracy under the constitutional monarchy. This 
includes all types of external aggression, espionage, hostile reconnaissance, 
sabotage, subversion, annoyance and inimical influence".5 Threats to Thailand 
can be categorised either as external or internal.6 However, threats to the 
existence of the Thai state as a political entity are mainly external ones.
Land-based threats are what the Thais feel most vulnerable to. As the 
nerve centre of the Thai civilisation has been the central plain valley, Thailand has 
attempted to maintain influence over its periphery, especially the trans-Mekong 
region, to prevent a successful external invasion. The main reason is, in the past, 
the central plain - Siam's administrative centre - has been subject to invasions by 
the Burmese from the west, Laotians from the northeast and Khmers from the 
east.
Based on these past experiences, the Thai ruling elites have, for centuries, 
regarded the trans-M ekong region comprising lowland Laos and most of 
Cambodia as their sphere of influence for both strategic and economic reasons. 
The Thai central plain and this area form "one geographical continuity unbroken 
by an easily defensible national barrier".7
The Thai security concern with the trans-Mekong region is three-fold. 
First, the fertile land of the Mekong basin attracts Thailand's attention.8 Second, 
the Thais are sensitive to potential threats to the present northeast region of 
Thailand down across the Mekong river.9 Third, it is derived from concern over 
the Vietnamese challenge and hence the necessity to maintain a buffer between 
Thailand and Vietnam.
5Thailand has always kept a careful watch on developments in the area of 
the trans-Mekong region. The interests in the Mekong basin have brought 
Thailand into conflict with Vietnam and the two states have been regarded as long­
time enemies. As early as the beginning of the nineteenth century Siam and 
Vietnam competed to extend their influence into the Mekong basin, in other 
words, into Laos and Cambodia. This has led to the current hostile feelings 
between Thailand and Vietnam as Leifer pointed out:
Although Thailand and Vietnam have never shared a common border their 
post-colonial relationship has also been shaped by historical experience of 
competition - in the case between culturally distinct peoples - for influence 
and advantage in the interposing states of Laos and Kampuchea. 10
Bangkok engaged in major wars with the Vietnamese to compete for 
influence in Cambodia in 1811, 1833-4 and 1841-6.11 The major concerns of the 
Thai Monarchs were to exercise rightful influence over Cambodia and to save it 
from divisiveness, as well as from the Vietnamese.12 In the 1820s the Thai 
influence over Cambodia was at its lowest ebb. At that time Cambodia was de 
facto divided into two parts - the Vietnamese exercised influence over southern 
Cambodia up to the Tonle Sap while the Thai imposed influence on the upper 
half.13 In the last war of the 1840s, an indecisive battle between Siam and 
Vietnam resulted in an agreement between them to neutralise Cambodia by a 
mutual withdrawal of their troops. Cambodia became a common tributary state 
between Vietnam and Siam.14 This was the only solution that could bring peace 
between Bangkok and Hue and served both countries' interests. Cambodia was 
also saved from being divided. Hence, the idea of keeping Cambodia as a buffer 
between Thailand and Vietnam was implemented before the French colonisation 
of Indochina.
The Chinese communist revolution in 1949 and the French defeat in 
Vietnam in 1954 reinforced the Thai fear of land-based threats.15 Communist- 
inspired insurgency and subversion supported by China and the Indochinese 
states led the Thai leadership to align itself with the United States and to join a 
formal alliance when the Manila Pact was signed in 1954. Apart from an 
ideological commitment against communism, the Thai-US military alliance also
6reflected the Thai historical concern with denying the Vietnamese dominance of 
the valley of the Mekong river.16
Perceived threats from the Indochinese states have been regarded as the 
driving force behind Thailand's foreign policy, which was directed to minimise 
those threats and to preserve national security. The threats from Indochina in 
general and Vietnam in particular has been Thailand's greatest perceived threat 
since the unification of Vietnam in 1975. The Indochinese states pose the threat 
of direct military invasion.17 The threat from China, on the contrary, has been 
perceived more in terms of political threat as a result of communist insurgency 
support rather than direct military invasion.18 Threat of military invasion from 
Indochina as perceived by the Thai elites has portrayed the Indochinese states as 
the greater threat to Thailand during the last two decades.
The height of Thailand's concern for land-based threats reached its peak at 
the end of 1978 after Vietnam invaded Kampuchea and toppled the Government 
of Democratic Kampuchea. The deployment of hundreds of thousands of 
Vietnamese troops along the Thai-Cambodian border alarmed Bangkok. This was 
the first time that Thailand, de facto, had a common border with its old arch-rival - 
the Vietnamese. The external threat faced by Thailand as a consequence of the 
Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia included occasional intrusions 
and violations of Thai territory by Vietnamese troops along the Thai-Cambodian 
borders, illegal refugees, underground arms sales and drug trafficking.19 Not 
only did Vietnam pose a threat to Thailand through Cambodia, it had also strong 
influence over Laos - a long-time client state to Thailand and a buffer between 
Siam and Vietnam. Thailand was most concerned about the Vietnamese military 
threat along the Thai border, terrorist activities and pro-Soviet, pro-Vietnam 
Communists in Laos, illegal refugees, black market activities, drug trafficking, 
arms sales and friction with Laos along the Mekong river.20 The promotion of 
relations with the PRC, the United States and the Asean countries since the end of 
1970s has been aimed at pressuring Vietnamese forces to leave Cambodia and 
was seen as a response to the projection of a hostile power (Vietnam) into the 
whole of the trans-Mekong area.21
7Thailand's national interests with regard to Indochina can be divided into 
the immediate and the long-term.22 The immediate interests are to restore peace 
and stability along the Thai-Kampuchean border, and stop the refugee influx. The 
long-term ones are: first, to remove Vietnamese forces; second, to restore the 
independent status of Kampuchea; and to normalise relations with the Indochinese 
states.23
An improvement of Sino-Thai relations would restrain Vietnam from 
military aggression against Thailand. There are two bases on which Thailand 
could expect China to play such role. First, historical hostility between China and 
Vietnam convinced Thanat Khoman, the then Thai Foreign Minister, and Thai 
foreign officials o f the possibility of future conflicts between them. The Thai 
hope of restraining the Vietnamese by using the Chinese card was justified when 
tensions took place in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. Vietnam had conflicting 
views with China over the idea of the Paris Accords of January 1973. While 
Hanoi thought that the Peace Accords opened fine prospects for the struggle for 
the reunification of Vietnam, Beijing hoped that it would stabilise the situation and 
lead to a genuine peace.24 China was worried about its relations with the United 
States, increasing Soviet influence on Vietnam, and the growing Vietnamese 
hegemonistic desire. In addition, the Chinese reduction of military aid to North 
Vietnam was closely watched by Thailand.25 Second, the Chinese decision to 
normalise its relations with the United States reflected China's new policy of 
moving closer to the West while the Sino-Soviet conflict was accelerating. It was 
apparent in 1970s that China would restrain Vietnam in the light of the Soviet- 
Vietnamese alliance.
2. The Withdrawal of the US from Indochina and the Search for a 
Protector in China
The normalisation of diplomatic relationships between Thailand and China 
was largely a product of the US withdrawal from the Southeast Asian mainland. 
The Paris Peace Talks in May 1968, Nixon's Guam Doctrine on 25 July 1969, 
and Kissinger's visit to Beijing in July 1971, all revealed the US foreign policy 
adjustment of abandoning the Cold War Doctrine. In the light o f US
8disengagement, Thailand foresaw a need to adjust its foreign policy to 
accommodate the Chinese while at the same time seeking to use China to restrain 
the Vietnamese. Thanat believed that Thailand could establish normal relations 
with China at a time when the Thai military regime and American leaders still 
portrayed China as expansionist. Conversely, Thanat perceived China as an old 
neighbour who would respect Thailand's sovereignty if the friendly Thai gesture 
was initiated. This belief was in accordance with the traditional Thai perspective 
with regard to its relationship with China.26 Thanat, therefore, enunciated a new 
foreign policy in March 1969 which aimed to achieve:
1. the withdrawal of American military forces;
2. a rapprochement with China;
3. the construction of a regional politico-economic framework capable of 
providing a counterbalance to communist expansion.27
Thailand also tried to seek external support through regional cooperation - 
Asean in particular. Thanat played a vital role as a mediator before the formation 
of Asean in 1967 and as Thailand's representative at subsequent Asean meetings, 
ensuring that Thailand was an active member. This policy was implemented 
while a dialogue with China was initiated. Unfortunately, the approach to China 
was opposed by Field Marshal Prapas Charusathien, the Deputy Prime Minister at 
that time, as he feared it would provide an opportunity for China to support 
subversive activities in Thailand.28
After Nixon visited Beijing in February 1972, and Fulbright-Aiken 
Amendment, which terminated all US combat activities in Indochina, was 
launched, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikajorn, the Prime Minister, and Prapas 
attempted to restore relations with China. They sent a Thai table-tennis team to 
Beijing in September 1972 and a trade mission to Canton Trade Fair in October.29 
Mass uprisings in October 1973 toppled the military regime and brought about 
significant changes to Thailand's political and economic system as well as to its 
foreign policy. These altered regional circumstances, coupled with internal 
changes following the October 1975 uprisings, led to the normalisation of 
diplomatic ties between Bangkok and Beijing in July 1975 .
9External elements
Historically speaking, such an adjustment of Thai foreign policy is not 
new and not unlike the traditional "bending with the wind" foreign policy of old 
Siam. The resumption of formal Thai-Chinese ties, therefore, was once again an 
attempt to come to terms with the post-Vietnam war situation when the old 
superpower was leaving and a newcomer was ready to come. This process was 
not just a move to get closer to China, but part of Thailand's effort to diversify its 
relations with all major powers. Former Prime Minister M.R. Kukrit Pramoj 
outlined the new foreign policy on 19 March 1975:
"...This government will promote peaceful co-existence by befriending 
every country which demonstrates goodwill towards Thailand, irrespective 
of difference in ideologies or political systems; rather, non-interference in 
internal affairs, justice, and equality will be the considered principle (in 
ordering bilateral relations).
In order to create a balance in relations with the (sic) superpowers, this 
government will endeavour to recognize and normalize ties with the 
People's Republic of China, to effect a withdrawal of foreign troops from 
Thailand within a year, through friendly negotiations and taking into 
account prevailing conditions in the region.
This government will strengthen ties with neighbouring countries and 
support co-operation with ASEAN in every way, while continuing to seek
O A
construction contacts with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." - 3 u
This outline manifested a total adjustment of Thai foreign policy as a 
reaction to the US disengagement from Southeast Asia and growing uncertainty in 
relation to its commitment toward Thailand. It marked a new era of equidistant 
policy for Thailand. Anand Panyarachun, the former Thai Ambassador to 
Washington D.C. and Thai permanent representative to the United Nations, who 
laid the ground work for the resumption of Thai-Chinese relations and who 
prepared for the visit to Peking by Prime Minister Kukrit in June 1975, said:
"The normalization, I think, was part and parcel of the whole adjustment 
process about foreign policy because there had to be a re-orientation of our 
foreign policy. In the past our foreign policy was perhaps a little bit 
security-oriented. In plain terms, it was just anti-communism, pure and 
simple. In those days, it was a bi-polar world, the policy of confrontation.
10
...But the thrust of our re-orientation then was that we should balance our 
close and cordial relationship with the United States with some very good 
relationships with some other states. This is where China came in."3 ^
Internal elements
The normalisation of Thai-Sino relations was partly an outcome of societal 
changes following the 1973 student uprising. The October 1973 incident brought 
about not only a new government, but also new thoughts on Thai political and 
social system. Previously, during the period from 1932 to 1973 the Thai political 
system had been dominated by the military. Thai foreign policy had mainly been 
formulated by the military and the security-related agencies such as the National 
Security Council (NSC), Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), Thai 
Central Intelligence Agency, and the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had only minor role in the foreign policy decision.32
The October 1973 uprising brought into the political system liberal 
thoughts espoused by politicians and intellectuals. But most important were those 
elements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) who had been, "long 
accorded a backseat role in the formation of Thailand's foreign policy."33 They 
then had a higher profile in foreign policy decision-making.34
One motive behind the normalisation of relations with China was the hope 
that Beijing would reduce its aid to the Thai communists given that communist 
insurgency was seen as the most severe internal threat to Thailand's security. The 
joint communique on 1 July 1975 demonstrated Bangkok's concern over this 
issue as both sides agreed that "all foreign aggression and subversion and all 
attempts by any country to control any other country or to interfere in its internal 
affairs are impermissible and are to be condemned."35
Another benefit that could be derived from China was a clearer and more 
defined policy towards the overseas Chinese. Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj was 
seeking a similar accord with China to that signed between China and Indonesia in 
1955, an accord in which Chinese nationality was no longer recognised. Kukrit 
could seek an agreement by the Chinese to declare that China did not recognize
11
dual nationality and urged Chinese residents in Thailand to abide by the law of 
Thailand and to respect the customs of the Thai people.36
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CHAPTER 2
THE THAI-CHINESE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP: MUTUAL 
INTERESTS IN PREVENTING VIETNAMESE DOMINATION OF
INDOCHINA
This chapter tries to answer some questions relevant to the transformation 
of Thai-Chinese relations after the normalisation of the diplomatic relationship in 
1975. The relationship became diverted into a security relationship whereby 
Thailand and China shared strategic partners in the 1980s. The first stage was 
marked by a diplomatic alignment and the coalescence of security interests 
between Thailand and China. The second phase has been a qualitative 
development of security relationship resulting in major arms purchases from 
China by Thai military circles. The crucial questions are:
1. Why did Thailand develop its security ties with China in the late 
seventies?
2. What is the nature of Thai-Chinese security relations and what are the 
benefits Thailand and China have received in strengthening such ties?
1. Reasons for Developing Security Ties with China 
1.1 Brief period of policy of equidistance
Reasons for the equidistant policy
The normalisation of diplomatic relationship with China did not 
spontaneously lead Bangkok to expand its security relationship with Beijing. 
Thailand tried to build friendship with China and improve its relationship with the 
Soviet Union while maintaining good ties with the United States. Indeed, 
Bangkok had struggled to maintain an equidistant foreign policy at best. In one 
respect, the normalisation with China marked a crucial starting point in 
diversifying Thai foreign policy into many directions, the beginning of a new era 
of equidistance. The policy of equidistance was to contribute to Thai security by 
ensuring that Thailand would have good relations with all great powers.
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Better ties with powerful China as an outcome of equidistance would 
decrease Beijing's hostile attitude towards Bangkok and help to restrain future 
Vietnamese aggression. An overture to the Soviet Union would also balance 
Thailand's relations with Washington and Beijing. If the effort to tap support 
from all those major powers were successful, it would allow Thailand, for a 
certain period of time, to concentrate more on the immediate security concern of 
the internal communist insurgency. Therefore, the equidistant policy was a 
strategy to preserve Thailand's national security by seeking external support to 
buy time for the more urgent task of fighting communism at home.
There were two important motives in employing an equidistant policy. 
First, there was the effort to promote peaceful co-existence with former 
adversaries and to keep Thailand away from any conflict. This policy demanded a 
balance-of-interests foreign policy in that it required Thailand not to identify with 
or not be hostile to any major power. The primary intent was to promote ties 
which yield mutual benefits with the major powers while seeking a compromising 
stance on issues of conflict. This foreign policy was based on the assumption that 
Thailand's maximum national interest could be maintained by being friends with 
all the major powers. Second, equidistance was a response to a perceivable, as 
opposed to an immediate, threat. It was to postpone the emergence of a threat 
while finding maximum support from all sides. In Thailand's case, the policy of 
equidistance could only work well when the state did not have a major immediate 
external threat to reckon with. If the state cannot cope with such a threat alone, an 
equidistant policy would not maximise security. Reliable support from a major 
power would provide a higher level of security.
The implementation of an equidistant foreign policy began with the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1975 and the effort to phase 
out South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), which succeeded in July 
1977. Thailand did not think that the United States would intervene decisively in 
the case of either communist insurgency or an encroachment on its territorial 
integrity by its communist neighbours. The Thais thought that the United States 
would probably not get involved in the most likely contingencies such as a 
localised armed conflict between neighbouring states in Southeast Asia.1
14
During Kriangsak Chamanand's administration, Thailand adopted three 
levels of equidistance: first, equidistance with the United States, the Soviet 
Union, China and Asean; second, equidistance with China and Vietnam; and 
third, equidistance with Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge Government. In terms of 
the first level, Kriangsak visited the Asean countries in February 1978, China 
from 29 March to 4 April, and the United States as well as the Soviet Union in 
1979. At the second level, Thailand tried to make an overture to unified Vietnam. 
This diplomatic effort was to keep China and Vietnam at the same distance from 
Thailand. The approach to Vietnam was accelerated by Pichai Rattakul, the 
Foreign M inister during Seni Pramoj's Government, who saw that the 
Vietnamese priority was national reconstruction. Hence, Vietnam would try to 
avoid any conflict with its neighbours. At the third level, Bangkok built 
equidistance between Vietnam and Kampuchea. The reason was that the 
reunification of Vietnam was not a domination of Indochina as Kampuchea was 
under Pol Pot - Vietnam's enemy. Thus, Kampuchea was still a Thai buffer and 
Vietnam had good reason to make friends with Thailand. This policy had earlier 
led to an establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam on 6 August 1976.
Kriangsak attempted to distance himself from both China and Vietnam 
initially. An attempt to demonstrate Bangkok's balanced position was made by 
the announcement that Thailand was sending a high level agricultural delegation to 
China and a party of diplomats to Phnom Penh during Pham Van Dong's visit to 
Bangkok.2 Following Dong's approach to Bangkok, Deng Xiaoping visited 
Thailand between 5-9 November 1978 shortly after Vietnam had signed Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. He said China had no 
intention of establishing its influence or seeking hegemony in this region and 
reaffirmed Thailand that if relations between the government and people are good, 
Thailand would not face the problem of communist insurgency.3 Once again, 
Kriangsak tried to keep a balance by stepping back from the Sino-Vietnamese 
conflict and not identifying Bangkok with any side. He made a cautious remark 
in response to the Chinese statement:
"We must listen to them because everybody has his own reason for saying 
what he says. Only deeds can bear out words, and it takes time to follow 
words with deeds. Time will prove an individual's sincerity.
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End of equidistance
The Thai policy of equidistance was finally abandoned following the 
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Such an invasion changed the fundamental 
situation in which equidistance can contribute to preserving maximum national 
interests. The Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea became an immediate threat to 
Thailand. This consideration and the Non Mark Moon incident turned Thailand 
towards a security alignment with China.
1.2 The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea: the overthrow of 
Thailand's equidistance
The relative (but short-lived) peace and stability in the Southeast Asian 
mainland restored after the Vietnam war was abruptly challenged and brought to a 
close at the end of 1978 when Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia and toppled 
the Pol Pot regime. The invasion of Cambodia shattered the prospect of a modus 
vivendi between Thailand and Asean on one hand and Vietnam on the other. 
Regional peace was put to an end and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 
further affected Thai national security in the following ways.
First, the most direct and serious repercussion was confrontation between 
Thailand and Vietnam. This was the first time in history that Bangkok and Hanoi, 
as old enemies, had a common border. Cambodia had, for centuries, served as a 
natural buffer between Thailand and Vietnam. When Cambodia was invaded by 
the old enemy, the crucial importance of the trans-Mekong area for Bangkok's 
national security was significantly raised.5 The potential threat of Vietnam was 
turned into a more immediate external threat. Kampuchea, under Vietnamese 
control, would tip the regional balance of power in favour of Vietnam. This 
increased the military advantage of Vietnam in relation to Thailand's vulnerable 
border areas. The Vietnamese threat involves psychological intimidation, 
subversion, incursions and possible invasion as well as outright colonisation.6
16
The Thai military was concerned that Vietnamese troops might intrude into 
Thailand in hot pursuit of Pol Pot's forces fleeing into the border area with the 
intention to test Thai military capacity. Such forces might also occupy strategic 
positions along the border areas. In the worst case scenario an all-out invasion of 
Thailand by Vietnam might be launched by using tanks and infantry divisions to 
penetrate the border into the inner cities.7 The approximate 200,000 Vietnamese 
troops in Cambodia and Laos were only part of the more-than-one-million 
Vietnamese army equipped with approximately 1,500 tanks and over 400 
operational aircraft supported by the Soviet Union.8
Second, Thailand has been facing a refugee influx. Prior to the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, nearly 230,000 refugees, most of whom were 
Meo hilltribe people from Laos, poured into Thailand.9 After the invasion, 
prolonged fighting between Kampuchean resistance forces and Vietnamese troops 
as well as widespread famine, led to an exodus of over a million refugees 
streaming across the Thai-Kampuchean border. Some 135,000 refugees fled into 
Thailand, while another one million escaped from Kampuchea staying along the 
Thai border.10 The influx of such massive numbers of refugees constituted not 
only an economic burden for Bangkok, it also presented the problem of having to 
screen real refugees from the Vietnamese army and other Kampuchean resistance 
forces. It was believed that among the refugees arriving daily were a number of 
Vietnamese intelligence agents.11
Third, there was also a link between external threat and internal security 
concerns. It used to be believed that the flourishing armed communist 
insurgencies in Thailand (at that time) might be further strengthened by 
Vietnamese support.12 Past Vietnamese and Laotian assistance to the Communist 
Party of Thailand (CPT) frightened the Thais and confronted them with the 
prospect o f an expanded Vietnam ese-backed com m unist insurgency. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict that followed the 
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, conflict between the CPT and Vietnam 
emerged. The pro-Chinese CPT leaders opposed the Vietnamese in Kampuchea 
and rejected the Vietnamese invitation to side with the Soviet-Vietnamese faction. 
The conflict between Chinese and Soviet-Vietnamese communism brought about a
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conflict within the CPT in the 1980s and led to the termination of support by Laos 
and Vietnam to the pro-Chinese CPT.
As the security environment of Thailand changed, Thailand sought more 
solid support to counter the imminent threat of Vietnam. However, Kriangsak's 
Government had tried to preserve equidistance as long as it could. Kriangsak 
initiated a two-prong strategy in an attempt to preserve Thai security while 
maintaining the policy of equidistance. The first prong was to seek international 
support for Thailand and to oppose the Vietnamese in Kampuchea. This strategy 
was intended to place some pressure upon Vietnam, but not as much as that 
envisioned by the subsequent strategy of "bleeding Vietnam white" during Prem's 
Administration. Kriangsak's strategy provided Bangkok with an opportunity to 
compromise with Hanoi as Thailand was careful not to provoke Vietnam. 
Kriangsak perceived a chance of long-term accommodation with Vietnam if it 
responded amicably. This was Kriangsak's struggle to maintain equidistance. 
The second prong was to keep Vietnam away from the Thai border by military 
means. This led Thailand to a security cooperation with China.
The first part of Kriangsak's effort was to seek external support from the 
United States, the Soviet Union, China, the Asean countries and Japan but to 
maintain a balanced position so as neither to provoke Vietnam nor to exclude the 
possibility of coming to terms with Hanoi. Kriangsak sought support from the 
Asean countries and organized a special meeting of Asean foreign ministers on 
12-13 January 1979, only five days after the fall of the Pol Pot regime. The result 
was a unified Asean calling for an immediate cease-fire in Kampuchea, the 
withdrawal of foreign troops and negotiation by all parties involved to resolve the 
conflict.13
Kriangsak also visited Washington, D.C. from 4 to 6 February to seek 
support for Bangkok, and Moscow during 21-27 March to improve Thai-Soviet 
bilateral relations. US leaders confirmed their commitment to the Manila Pact and 
stated that it would accelerate the shipment of military equipments already 
purchased by Thailand14, even though the credibility and reliability of US 
commitment had significantly declined since the post-Vietnam war. The US War
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Powers Act of 1973 imposed a 60-day limit on the President's power to commit 
forces but if there was no open invasion the likely outcome would be only 
material and financial assistance.15 The visit to the Soviet Union was an attempt 
to balance the relations with the United States and China and to seek Soviet 
assurances that it would restrain Vietnam from any further aggression.16 These 
efforts were aimed at maintaining Thailand's balanced relations with the major 
powers and to solicit maximum support from all.
With regard to the relationship with China, Kriangsak avoided overt 
identification with Peking following the tension generated by the Chinese attack 
on Vietnam in February 1979. He emphasised that Bangkok would not accept 
any military aid from Beijing in the event of a military attack and Thailand would 
not be used by any state in the conflict in Cambodia.17 Nevertheless, Kriangsak 
had secretly agreed to cooperate with China since January 1979 to support the 
Khmer Rouge militarily. It was the starting point of the Sino-Thai security 
re la tionsh ip . This was the second prong of the strategy aimed at keeping 
Vietnamese troops away from the Thai border by giving military support for the 
Khmer resistance forces. There was a report that Thai helicopters were sent to 
Poi Pet, a Cambodian town opposite to the Thai border, to take Ieng Sary, 
Cambodian Foreign Minister, to Thailand.18 In addition, since 1979 Bangkok 
has agreed to pass on 500 tons of military and other supplies to Khmer resistance 
forces every month. The amount was doubled to 1,000 tons per month during the 
first half of 1980.19 This secret cooperation with China was played down by 
Kriangsak as he did not intend to move closer to Beijing and abandon the policy 
of equidistance.
1.3 Non Mark Moon incident
The event that put an end to the last hope of reaching a modus vivendi 
between Thailand and Vietnam was the first Vietnamese incursion into Thailand in 
the so-called "Non Mark Moon Incident". About 200-300 Vietnamese soldiers of 
the 2nd regiment, the 7th Division of the Vietnamese army invaded the Thai 
border on 23 June 1980 and occupied two Thai villages and two camps housing 
Kampuchean refugees.20 As a result of fighting with Vietnamese occupants, 22
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Thai soldiers were killed while total Thai casualties were 60. Although it was not 
a large-scale invasion, this Vietnamese action was intended to warn Thailand 
against the repatriation of Cambodian refugees. It was also a test of Thai 
military's preparedness and its capacity to react to Vietnamese border activities. It 
confirmed the conviction of the Thais that the threat of Vietnamese invasion was 
real and imminent.
The incursion also proved that the Vietnamese promise, as stated in May 
1980 by Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, that Vietnam would 
respect Thai sovereignty, territorial integrity and security, was a sham. The carrot 
used by Bangkok was ineffectual. Prior to the incursion Kriangsak was forced to 
resign from the premiership in February after the fuel prices crisis. His departure 
brought an end to Thai commitment to maintain the equidistance policy. This 
factor, together with the imminent larger threat from Vietnam, resulted in a hard­
line policy adopted by the new government of General Prem Tinsulanondha. 
Thanat Khoman, while serving as Deputy Prime Minister in early 1980s, 
described his perception of Vietnam in the following terms:
"...For years, governments and people in this region have been 
brainwashed into believing that the main source of threat lies with the 
PRC...that shallow and easy deduction flowed from certain facts....These 
facts blinded people to the reality that a victorious North Vietnam 
supported by a powerful protector and sponsor could combine to become a 
more menacing than a populous but underdeveloped colossus."2 ^
The incursion into Non Mark Moon village finally pushed Bangkok to 
find a reliable and credible security guarantor against the Vietnamese. The United 
States, nevertheless, was unlikely to assist by sending its troops into Thailand to 
fight the Vietnamese. The Vietnam War still haunted the American people and the 
US Government. The only solid support Thailand could get from Washington 
was arms aid. On 28 June 1980, US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie 
announced that the United States would step up its assistance to Thailand. Also, 
in July, the United States announced the immediate emergency airlift of small 
arms and artillery. M-16 rifles, 106 mm. recoilless rifles, and 105 mm. 
Howitzers were expedited while the shipment of more important weapons such as 
M-48 A5 tanks would be made ahead of the schedule.22 US military assistance
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had soared as well during this period (early 1980s) - from US$ 31.2 m. in 1979 
to $37.2 m. in 1980, $50 m. in 1981 and around $80 m. in 1982.23 Moreover, 
joint Thai-US military exercises code-named "Cobra Gold" were introduced in 
1982. Other kinds of security co-operation were established in the '80s such as 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Logistical Support and the War 
Reserve Stockpile.
2. Thai-Chinese Security Ties
The inadequate guarantee provided by Washington prompted Bangkok to 
find a more credible and reliable security guarantor - China. China had already 
demonstrated its ability to support Thailand by engaging in a war of punishment 
against Vietnam during February-March 1979, albeit with heavy casualties. 
Moreover, Deng Xiaoping told Thai Deputy Premier, Dawee Chullasapya, in June 
1979 that China would help Thailand in every way if it was invaded by 
Vietnam.24 Thailand, therefore, sought Chinese security assistance and in return 
facilitated the shipment of Chinese arms and material supplies to the Khmer 
Rouge. This initial development (arms shipment to the Khmer Rouge), initiated 
by Kriangsak, has served as the basis for multi-dimensional security relations 
between the two countries.
China perceived the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia, particularly its 
alliance with Vietnam, as part of a strategy of encircling China and controlling 
strategic straits connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans, enabling it to control the 
sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to the West Pacific.25 The Vietnamese invasion 
of Kampuchea, in the opinion of China was part of the Soviet strategy of using 
Vietnam as a springboard to achieve the aim of Vietnamese regional hegemony in 
Indochina and, in the larger context, to contain China and dominate the Southeast 
Asian sea lanes. China, whose traditional security concern was to ensure the 
security of its southern borders by maintaining stability in the Southeast Asian 
mainland and preventing the domination of Indochina by any regional power, 
would act to prevent Vietnamese domination of the area. Support for the Khmer 
Rouge was a low-cost and low-risk strategy to weaken Vietnam and to return to
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the status-quo in the Southeast Asian mainland prior to the invasion of Phnom 
Penh.
China's commitment to Thailand was strengthened under Prem's 
Government and has involved large-scale military aid to the Khmer Rouge via 
Thailand in return for a reduction of Chinese assistance to the CPT. China also 
provided Thailand with a security guarantee by threatening Vietnam with "a 
second lesson" should it decide to invade Thailand. The Chinese army on 
Vietnam's northern border has placed pressure on Vietnam on the occasion of a 
serious conflict between Vietnamese forces and the Khmer resistance forces near 
the Thai border, or in the case of any attack by the Vietnamese against Thailand. 
As an outgrowth of the security linkage, formal and informal visits by political, 
economic and military leaders of both sides have dramatically increased, 
especially since 1981. These included the visits by the Crown Prince and 
Princess Mahachakri Sirinthorn. All Thai Supreme Commanders have visited 
China since 1981 - Gen. Serm Na Nakorn, in May 1981, followed by Gen. 
Saiyud Kerdphol in August 1983, Gen Arthit Kamlangek in May 1984 and Gen. 
Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh in May 1987 and November 1988.26 In return, the 
Chinese Air Force Commander visited Bangkok in 1981, followed by the Navy 
Commander in 1982 and the Chief of the General Staff, Gen. Yang Dezhi, who 
visited Thailand in 1983 and 1987.27 As security collaboration developed, other 
security ties emerged.
Such security ties were based on the assumption that Thailand had a 
common interest in restraining Vietnamese influence in Indochina. Thailand 
benefited from having China as the security guarantor at a time when it confronted 
the most immediate external threat. China also gained access to Southeast Asia 
via Thailand. It could place pressure upon Vietnam through the Khmer Rouge to 
prevent its domination of Indochina and hence, preventing the Soviet encirclement 
of China in the South. The Thai-Chinese security ties during Prem's term as 
Prime Minister had evolved into an "open alignment".28 The benefits of such a 
security relationship include Chinese military and diplomatic pressure upon 
Vietnam, the reduction of assistance to the CPT, and arms transfers to Thailand.
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2.1 Chinese direct military pressure on Vietnam
China has applied direct military pressure on Vietnam by extending 
military support to the Khmer Rouge and by placing forces along the border with 
Vietnam.
Assistance to the Khmer resistance forces
Military assistance to the Khmer Rouge via Thailand and safe sanctuaries 
on Thai soil served both Thai and Chinese interests in stopping Vietnam from 
gaining full control of Kampuchea. For Thailand, although the Khmer Rouge in 
the past had always cruelly harassed Thai villagers near the border, Vietnamese 
troops in Cambodia were more menacing and became a far greater threat.
Thai support for the Khmer Rouge, initiated by Kriangsak, was a 
response to a request by Deng Xiaoping to Sunthorn Hongradarom, Deputy 
Prime Minister at that time, to provide a passage through Thailand for Pol Pot and 
his faction and to permit China to send material aid to the regime.29 The informal 
co-operation has gradually been institutionalised as the threat from Vietnam 
increased with more frequent incursions into Thailand by Vietnamese forces from 
Kampuchea.
Chinese military aid to the Khmer Rouge forces has been extended to the 
non-communist resistance forces as well after the Asean-backed Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was formed in June 1982. It 
was believed that the Thai army supervised the transfer of Chinese supplies 
unloaded at Sattahip, a deep water port southeast of Bangkok, to the border by 
trucks and that those supplies were distributed under Thai military control to the 
Khmer resistance forces.30 This was a large scale operation involving 300-500 
tons of material supplies every month.31
These security ties with China served as a springboard for expanding 
Thai-Chinese security relations by increasing the strength and sustenance of the 
Khmer resistance forces. From around 22,000 armed forces in 1979, the CGDK
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forces had increased to around 60,000 in 1986.32 The ability of the Khmer 
Rouge to maintain themselves as an actor in the Kampuchean issue and their 
international recognition was a crucial factor which confirmed the stance of Thai 
policy during Gen. Prem's Administration and the utility of Sino-Thai security 
relations.33 Although Vietnamese dry-season offensives during 1984-5 destroyed 
the strongholds of the Khmer resistance forces, those forces still maintained their 
presence by launching small-scale guerrilla attacks in many parts of Kampuchea 
while campaigning for international support.
Military support to the Khmer Rouge and the provision of sanctuaries in 
the event of attacks by Vietnam inside the Thai border served as basis for the Thai 
effort to force Vietnamese out of Kampuchea. This strategy was undertaken in 
conjunction with the diplomatic effort aimed at isolating Vietnam economically 
and politically over the past decade.
Chinese military pressure on Vietnam's northern border
China's direct military threat to Vietnam was another crucial means in 
supporting Thailand. After the first Chinese incursion into Vietnam in February 
1979, China demonstrated firmly its support to Thailand and Asean. Most 
Chinese high-ranking officials have always voiced their military support of 
Thailand against Vietnamese aggression in any exchange of visits between the two 
states. For example, Deng Xiaoping announced in October 1979 the Chinese 
position in support of Asean and Thailand should Vietnam attack them.34 Vice 
Minister of Trade Chen Jie stated that Beijing "will help not only in providing 
food but also m ilitary m aterials so that Thailand may preserve its 
independence".35 In a press conference in February 1981, Zhao Ziyang said "If 
Vietnam invades Thailand we shall resolutely stand on the side of Thailand and 
support the Thai people's struggle against aggression".36 An important assertion 
made by China was Yang Dezhi's statement in February 1983 that the Chinese 
Army and people will not remain indifferent if Vietnam launches an armed attack 
on Thailand.37
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Chinese support to Thailand (or the threat of military action against 
Vietnam) was essential for the Thais who have been frequently faced with 
Vietnamese incursions since the Non Mark Moon incident and the intrusion into 
Ban Sa Ngae village in 1981. The annual dry-season offensives on the 
Kampuchean resistance sanctuaries along the Thai border had heightened Thai 
anxiety. A new strategy introduced by Gen. Le Due Anh, Commander-in-Chief 
of Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, in December 1984 increasingly alarmed the 
Thais as Vietnam demonstrated that it was prepared to launch large-scale attacks 
on Kampuchean resistance forces along the Thai border. Vietnam was in a 
position to enter into Thai territory to get rid of the Khmer guerrillas.38 The 
Vietnamese destroyed the KPNLF camp at Nong Chan in mid-November 1984 
and headquarters at Ampil in January 1985, the Khmer Rouge bases in Phnom 
Malai in February and the Sihanoukist main stronghold at Tatum in March.
To match words with deeds, China maintained 250,000 troops near 
Vietnamese border to back its pledge of a second lesson against Vietnam.39 
Artillery bombardments and incursions across Vietnam's border would occur in 
reaction to Vietnamese incursions into Thailand. The heavy shelling and a brief 
intrusion into northern Vietnam in March 1985 erupted after heavy fighting inside 
Thailand at Surin province in which more than 40 Thai soldiers and 300 
Vietnamese died.40
2.2 Diplomatic pressure - the united front against Vietnam
Thailand and Asean are necessary for China in its effort to build a united 
front in Southeast Asia against Hanoi on the Kampuchean issue. This policy was 
based on the assumption that Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea was a case of 
hegemonic behaviour threatening the security of Thailand and Asean. An 
acceptance of the fait accompli of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea 
would serve as a precedent for future practice by other countries in Southeast 
Asia.
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Thailand's interest in this issue was to gain the widest support of the 
international community in opposing and pressuring Vietnam to roll back from 
Kampuchea. Bangkok struggled to minimise the Vietnamese threat by recreating 
a Kampuchean buffer between Thailand and Vietnam. Therefore, Thailand has 
moved to build a united front composed of Asean, China, the United States, 
Japan and western countries together, to pressure Vietnam with all the means at its 
disposal - condemning Hanoi in international fora and isolating the Vietnamese 
diplomatically, politically and economically.
The united front against Vietnam was part of an effort to "bleed Vietnam 
white". Vietnam was to be pressured by the international community for its 
occupation of Kampuchea. Economic aid and investments from the West and 
Japan were to be cut. This strategy has been a means of inducing economic 
stagnation within Vietnam while its international political status was in jeopardy. 
Such means were to be combined with military pressure from China and the 
Khmer Rouge. China and Thailand hoped that the effort to "bleed Vietnam white" 
would weaken Hanoi to the point of it becoming an insignificant threat and 
withdrawing its occupying forces. This is a significant change from Kriangsak's 
strategy which relied on a softer approach to accommodate with Hanoi.
This effort required cooperation from the international community, and 
above all from Thailand and the Asean countries. China has had to compromise 
to gain Asean's support. There have been some disagreements between China 
and Asean regarding the role of the Khmer Rouge and resolution on the conflict. 
In this respect, Thailand serves as a bridge between China and Asean. When 
Asean saw a need to form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK) to solicit wider support in the UN, Thailand played a major role in 
persuading China to agree. After Prime Minister Prem conveyed to the Chinese 
leader the Asean idea during his visit to Beijing in October 1980, China declared 
its support for the proposal during Zhao Ziyang's visit to Bangkok in February 
1981.41 Following Foreign Minister ACM Siddhi Savetsila's visit to Beijing in 
May 1982 during which the issue was discussed in detail, Prime Minister Zhao 
Ziyang agreed that "China desires to assist the ASEAN countries in promoting the
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alliance of the three patriotic forces in Kampuchea. China desires to see an 
independent, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea".42
Gradually, China's stance on the Kampuchean issue has been more in 
common with that of Asean. China has compromised on many issues like the 
formulation of the "Proximity Talks" proposed in 1985 and the Eight-Point Peace 
Plan in 1986. The Chinese acceptance of the quadripartite coalition proposal in 
March 1986 was a transformation of Beijing's previous hard-line attitude of 
demanding Kampuchea's full independence with the exclusion of any role for the 
"puppet" Heng Samrin's Government. The Chinese statement of 1 July 1988 
also demonstrated a change of heart on the part of China with regard to the 
settlement process of the Kampuchea issue. The statement indicated a willingness 
to create a provisional quadripartite coalition government after a withdrawal, a 
freeze upon all Kampuchean factions' military activities and effective international 
supervision of Vietnam's troop withdrawal.43 This contradicted the Chinese 
refusal to disarm all the Khmer factions as proposed by Asean in the Kampuchean 
conference in New York in July 1981.44 It is likely that China will finally agree 
to a Kampuchean peace process if an accord is reached between the CGDK and 
Phnom Penh and endorsed by Asean.
2.3 Reduction of assistance to the CPT
The security cooperation which Thailand has established with China was 
used as a quid pro quo for the Chinese reduction of its support for the CPT. 
Before the security relationship was established, China confirmed its dual track 
diplomacy - separating govemment-to-government and party-to-party relations. 
The 1979 secret deal to supply arms to the Khmer Rouge resulted in a 
transformation of the Chinese position regarding the CPT. The Voice of the 
People of Thailand (VOPT), the clandestine radio station located either in Yunnan 
province in China or in northern Laos was closed in July of that year, ending its 
broadcasts which had begun in 1962.45 The emphasis on party-to-party relations 
was further toned down as Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang stated before Foreign 
Minister Siddhi in 1981 that relation between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
and the CPT was a matter of history and China had already withdrawn all its
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backing, except for moral and political ties.46 Wu Xueqian, the then Chinese 
Foreign Minister, further announced in 1983 that the problem of the CPT was an 
internal affair of Thailand, in which China would not interfere 47
The reduction of Chinese support to the CPT has contributed to a drastic 
deterioration in CPT strength. The CPT armed forces were reduced from more 
than 10,000 in 1979 to less than 7,200 in 1981 and less than 2,400 in 1983.48 
Nevertheless, the curtailment of Chinese support to the CPT was not the major 
reason for the declining of the communist organisation. The ideological conflict 
between China and the Soviet Union and the conflict between China and Vietnam 
resulted in conflict between the pro-Soviet, pro-Vietnamese communist faction 
and pro-Beijing leaders. The Sino-Vietnamese conflict caused Hanoi to seek a 
dominant role in the CPT's future by supporting its operations. Hanoi offered to 
send a number of Laotian troops to cooperate with the CPT in its operations.49 
The refusal of the CPT to consider Vietnamese support angered Hanoi and 
compelled Vietnam and Laos to terminate assistance to the CPT. As a 
consequence, the CPT lost its training centres and sanctuaries in Vietnam and 
more than 21 bases in Laos.
The rift within the CPT itself was a major reason for its declining role. In 
December 1978, the party was split into three major factions. The dominant 
group was the pro-Beijing which was committed to Maoist rural-based 
revolution.50 Another faction was the pro-Soviet, pro-Vietnamese group, led by 
Boonyen Worthong. The third faction was a nationalist and neutralist faction led 
by Thirayut Boonmee. These major difficulties of the CPT, when faced with the 
Prime Minister's Order No. 66/23 to resolve the communist insurgency by means 
of political and economic programs, contributed to its breakup.
A drastic decline in the CPT and the mass surrender of many of its 
personnel in 1980s following the Chinese reduction of support; its internal 
conflict; the closing-down of its sanctuaries in Laos; and the Thai Government's 
amnesty program, gradually transformed Thai attitudes towards China. A survey 
conducted among the Thai elites in 1983 revealed that China was the fourth 
greatest threat following Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Kampuchea. The most
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likely threat was in the form of political intervention followed by meddling with 
the minorities in Thailand.51 This attitude was quite different from that of the 
period of 1977-8. During the early period the majority of the Thai elites believed 
that China intended to invade Thailand. China was also perceived as the second 
greatest threat after Vietnam.52
In sum, the Chinese reduction of support to the CPT initially served as an 
incentive to Thailand in engaging in security relationship with China. But as 
security relations developed, the Thai attitude towards China was changed for the 
better and this transformed perception will further promote their security 
relationship. In this respect, Chinese reduction of support to the CPT may also be 
seen as an outcome of this increase in security ties.
2.4 Purchases of Chinese arms
The ability of China to restrain Vietnamese aggression against Thailand, 
however, was not without question. The frequent penetration into Thai territory 
by Vietnamese forces since 1981 and the 1984-85 offensive identified China as a 
"Paper Tiger". It could neither effectively prevent Vietnamese aggression on 
Thailand nor obstruct Hanoi's annual dry-season offensives aimed at eliminating 
the Khmer resistance forces. Needless to say the first attack upon Vietnam in 
1979 still stunned China in view of its heavy losses and the more effective than 
expected Vietnamese military capacity. While China deployed around 250,000 
troops near Vietnam's border, Hanoi had increased its forces to around 500,000 
with far better and more modern weapons from the Soviet Union.53
Moreover, the Four Modernisations program of China focussed most 
resources on development of the economy and a peaceful environment was a 
prerequisite for investments from abroad. In 1984 China adopted a "no war and 
no peace" strategy with Vietnam by occupying a small 15 km front in the Ha 
Giang area along the Sino-Vietnamese border and placing pressure with frequent 
artillery bombardments along the border.54 In the light of these considerations 
China was unlikely to engage in a major war with Vietnam short of an all-out 
invasion of Thailand.
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Thailand's purchase of Chinese weapons is a new development in Sino- 
Thai security relationship. It is a response to the limitation of Chinese capability 
and credibility in restraining Vietnam in that it aims to bolster Thailand’s capability 
to defend itself. This requires a defence build-up program. Thailand, therefore, 
bought batches of arms from China.
Such sales were friendly gestures and gave more weight to Chinese 
psychological assurances against Vietnamese aggression. The Thai military 
perceived that Chinese arms sales to Thailand would compensate for China's 
limited security role, as Beijing was in pursuit of detente with Vietnam. An 
adjustment of Thailand's military strategy also demanded a great number of 
modem weapons. The threat from Vietnam made Thailand alter its defense 
strategy from that of a guerrilla fighting strategy, aimed at eliminating communist 
insurgency in the late 1970s, to a strategy of increasing Thailand's conventional 
warfare capability and improving its "combat readiness" and "war potential". 
This was suggested in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Paper in 1977 and the 
Fourth and Fifth National Economic and Social development Plans (NESDP) 
(1977-81 and 1982-86).55
As a result of the nature of the threat and the national defence strategy, 
Thailand required new weapons to counter the Vietnamese threat. For the Army, 
Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) were of high importance to check Vietnamese tank 
battalions, especially Soviet T-series MBTs, deployed in Kampuchea. The Army 
also needed anti-tank weapons such as rocket launchers, recoilless rifles and anti­
tank missiles. The Air Force required combat planes capable of warding off 
attacks from the MIG-2 Is deployed by Laos and Vietnam, an air base defence 
system, and a ground attack capability. The Navy also saw the necessity of 
procuring high-speed patrol boats with arms and mine-sweepers to defend the 
southeastern provinces and the Gulf of Thailand.56
Traditionally, the main sources of Thailand's arms supplies were the 
United States and Western countries such as the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany. The initial connection with the Chinese was the grant of some light 
weapons by China such as AK47, RPG, and ammunition in the early 1980s.57
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In 1985, Bangkok was offered 36 130-mm artillery guns, ammunition and 6-10 
T-69 tanks to use along the Thai-Kampuchean border as a gift in response to the 
Thai request during Yang Dezhi's visit to Thailand in 1983.58 This took place 
when the economic recession in Thailand had prompted Bangkok to find 
alternative sources of weapons at lower prices that would lessen its dependence 
on the United States.
The first major purchases of Chinese weapons came in 1987. In May, 
Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh signed a contract to buy 30 T69-II tanks, 20 T-653 
and T-84 tanks, 400 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and computer- 
controlled anti-aircraft artillery guns to be stationed at major air bases in Korat, 
Takli, Ubon Ratchatani and Udom Thani.59 These purchases were linked with 
the US decision to scrap all Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits to Bangkok in 
that (US) fiscal year, even though the grant aid was increased from US$4-5 mil. 
to $50 mil 60(see Appendix A). This may also be related to the announcement of 
Gen. Chaovalit in early 1987 that the Thai and Chinese armies would exchange 
military training in the future. The Royal Thai Army (RTA) is ready to accept 
Chinese defence aid if there are no strings attached.61
The major incentive for buying Chinese arms was the combination of 
cheap price and reliable quality. The purchasing prices cost around 1,000 million 
baht but it was only 4-5 per cent of the actual selling prices.62 The T-69 II tanks, 
for example, cost 7 million baht each and cost 200 million baht for 30 units. With 
the same amount of money Thailand could buy less than 10 tanks from western 
countries.63 In terms of credits, Chinese arms provided a long grace period and 
long-term payment. Some drawbacks of Chinese arms are their lower efficiency 
and level of technology. For instance, Chinese 130-mm artillery guns have a 22- 
24 km radius while those of the Soviets can fire as far as 30 km. However, the 
not-so-advanced technology is enough to check the Vietnamese threat and can 
fulfil Thailand's need for weapons to meet the threat in the short and medium 
term. Thailand will purchase more modern (and costly) weapons after its 
economy has improved in 10-15 years time.64 Rapid delivery and reliable quality 
can also compensate for the slow process of buying US weapons, which requires 
permission from the Government, the Congress and a period of waiting. Chinese
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APCs and tanks could be delivered within three months after the order.65 The 
arms purchased are also only major weapons like MBTs and artillery guns which 
could be operated with western technology. The 105 mm guns of T-69 tanks, as 
an example, could be replaced by UK 105 mm. guns.66
The second major purchase comprises another 23 T-69 tanks, 360 APCs, 
mine-sweepers, an anti-aircraft radar guidance system and a Surface-to-Air 
Missile (SAM) guidance system.67 These weapons were intended to be the main 
arms deployed to prevent a Vietnamese attack. Not only did the Army prefer 
buying Chinese weapons, the Navy and the Air Force have followed suit. The 
Navy agreed to buy 4 frigates worth 600 million baht. A similar purchase from 
western countries would have cost 2,000 million baht.68 The Air Force is 
considering a purchase of 18 F-7 M fighter aircraft from China, which are 33 per 
cent cheaper than F-16 fighter-bombers of the United States but their efficiency is 
comparable to that of US F-5E Tigers.69
The purchases of Chinese arms are a stepping stone for wider military 
cooperation between Thailand and China. Military exchanges and joint exercises 
were initiated as a result of the compatibility of both nations' weapons.70 The 
army also has a plan of sending personnel to China for military training.71 The 
most distinctive scheme in Sino-Thai security cooperation is the second "War 
Reserve Stockpile" which is going to be established in Thailand as the first of its 
kind of such Chinese program with other countries. The purchases of Chinese 
weapons make it essential for Thailand to reserve Chinese spare parts and 
ammunition for use in a future crisis. The fighting with Laos at Ban Rom Klao in 
early 1988 almost depleted Thai ammunition during a critical period. Therefore, 
the "War Reserve Stockpile" scheme gains wide military support because it will 
be a necessity should Thailand face a conflict with its neighbours. Apart from 
China, other arms producing countries such as Belgium, the United Kingdom, 




The Thai policy of equidistance was the genesis of Thailand's diplomatic 
relationship with Beijing. This first period had witnessed an adjustment of 
Bangkok's foreign policy to restore regional order and stability and maintain its 
independence. Thailand had balanced its position with all the major powers to 
maximise external support while avoiding antagonising the Vietnamese. By 
1978, Thailand was in a secure position with confidence and stability restored.
The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea was the major catalyst in the 
initiation of Sino-Thai security ties. Thailand, under Kriangsak's Government, 
had attempted to maintain the policy of equidistance while keeping the Vietnamese 
away from the Thai border. Kriangsak still hoped to come to terms with Vietnam. 
The succession of Kriangsak by Prem and the Non Mark Moon incident 
constituted a watershed in a new era of Sino-Thai relationship. The policy of 
equidistance was replaced by the policy of an open alignment with China.
As Thailand lost interest in a possible rapprochement with Vietnam (as a 
result of the failure of the equidistance policy), it attempted to protect its own 
security while placing as much pressure upon Vietnam as possible. Thailand, 
therefore, accepted China as security guarantor against Vietnam while cooperating 
with Beijing to supply the Khmer resistance forces fighting the Vietnamese. 
Security ties have developed from this foundation. This security alignment is 
based on the perceived "common interests" of the two states. China could assume 
the role of a regional power through Thailand. Thailand also obtained important 
concessions. China would help to restrain Vietnam and reduce its support for the 
CPT. As the threat from Vietnam and the communist insurgency were the two 
greatest threats - external and internal - to Thai security, they were the bases of the 
cordial Sino-Thai security relationship.
The Sino-Thai security relationship entered a new stage when China's role 
as the security guarantor finally decreased. The major dry-season Vietnamese 
offensives during 1984-85 lessened Thai confidence in the Chinese. This resulted 
in a defence build-up program to ensure Thailand's security by way of self-
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reliance. Security ties between Thailand and China in the late 1980s, thus, have 
gone beyond the point where China's significance for Thailand was only as 
security guarantor. Security ties in the area of arms purchases have been 
significantly developed. China's role as a major arms supplier to Thailand will 




THE IMPACT OF THAI-CHINESE SECURITY RELATIONS
UPON ASEAN
The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia has created a 
paradox. On the one hand, the Asean states have strengthened their diplomatic 
and political co-operation resulting in the expression of a unified stance on the 
Kampuchean problem. The success of Asean in terms of its unified diplomatic 
effort and economic achievement is so apparent that it has been stated that "The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations is the most effective and by far the most 
successful regional grouping among developing states".1 23 On the other hand, 
Thailand and China have become strategic partners on the Kampuchean issue. 
This relationship undermines the unity of Asean and serves as a potential source 
of conflict within the organisation.
This chapter focuses on the extent to which the paradox could affect the 
unity of Asean by examining divergences of perspectives among the Asean 
countries towards Thai-Chinese security relations. These issues are discussed:
1. Thailand's dilemma between promoting relations with China and 
maintaining Asean's unity.
2. Indonesian and Malaysian perspectives on the Thai-Chinese security 
relationship, which includes the stalemate on the Kampuchean 
problem and the Thai-Chinese military ties.
3. The perspectives of Singapore, the Philippines, and Brunei.
1. Thailand’s Dilemma
The alignment with China is seen by Thai leaders as a necessity to 
minimise the immediate threat from Vietnam by aligning with a more powerful 
security guarantor. Since 1979, Thailand has been entangled with two major 
strategic issues; how to implement security measures against internal insurgency 
(which has intensified during 1976 to the early 1980s) and how to deal with the 
imminent external threat from Vietnam. Only China had both the capability and 
intention to fulfil Thailand's need. The Thai predisposition against Vietnam and 
its preoccupation with the traditional concept of Kampuchea as its buffer state
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further shaped the Thai perspective on the Kampuchean problem as distinct from 
those of Indonesia and Malaysia. At the same time, the increasing Chinese role 
was seen as beneficial.
Nevertheless, Thailand has always announced that Asean is a cornerstone 
of Thai foreign policy. Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila noted that Thailand's 
foreign policy was established on the following principles:
First, to promote solidarity, unity and cooperation of ASEAN, and to extend 
that cooperation to development of good relations with our Indochina 
neighbours. Second to pursue mutually beneficial relations with all 
countries irrespective of differences in political, social and economic 
systems and ideologies. Third, to contribute, in her own capacity to 
regional and global stability and development and, finally adherence to the 
principles of international law and the UN Charter.2
Asean is important to Thailand in various ways. Even though Asean did 
not become an organisation for "collective political defence" to replace the alliance 
with the United States as was hoped by Thanat Khoman3, it did restore 
Thailand's confidence amidst regional instability while the second Indochina war 
was still in full steam. Asean benefited Thailand politically and economically. 
Support for Bangkok's Kampuchean policy on the part of the international 
community, especially among the third world countries and the West, could not 
have materialised without Asean support. In economic terms, although intra- 
Asean economic relations are limited, Asean provides Thailand with bargaining 
power against its dialogue partners. Moreover, Asean provides a peaceful 
process for the resolution of conflicts among its members. Regional order and 
stability are Thailand's objectives as well as those of Asean.
Ironically, although Asean is beneficial to Thailand and Bangkok 
proclaims Asean as the top priority in its "declaratory policy", Asean is not the 
first priority in Thailand's "action policy" over the Kampuchean issue. China, on 
the other hand, serves as the most important country in preserving Thailand's 
security and as a deterrent to a possible Vietnamese invasion. Its countervailing 
power and support for the Khmer Rouge are a more effective means than the 
diplomatic support of Asean.4 After the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and
36
the incursion into Thailand at Non Mark Moon village, Thailand needed a credible 
security guarantor more than anything else. One scholar even pointed out:
Because the issue of Kampuchea was judged by Prem's government to be of 
acute security concern, the cohesion of Asean - hardly a source of 
countervailing power - constituted a lesser priority.
ZOPFAN is irrelevant and has never been regarded by Thailand as its real 
foreign policy objective. The commitment to Asean and ZOPFAN is only a stated 
policy, not on an operational basis. As Thailand is still faced with both internal 
and external threats, external powers still have an important contribution to make 
to Thai security. In sum, even though ZOPFAN is too idealistic for Thailand, 
whose objective is to preserve the status quo by maintaining regional balance of 
power, Thailand has not been opposed to the idea.
On the Kampuchean issue, the role of Asean is limited to only diplomatic 
means. Its role is complementary to Thai efforts that seek external support against 
possible Vietnamese aggression. The commitment to Asean will be useful as long 
as Asean can help to minimise those threats through political and diplomatic 
means. Thailand's eagerness to form Asean in the late sixties, for example, was a 
response to the unfavourable external environment in the region. The expanding 
communist influence in Vietnam, the threat from China, and the domestic 
communist insurgency were the prime factors that drove Bangkok into seeking 
potential assistance from other regional states.6 Thailand also wished to form a 
group of "collective political defence" to replace the fading SEATO. In joining 
ASEAN, Thailand hoped that Indonesia would allow the organisation to become 
an effective force in the wake of the American withdrawal from the Southeast 
Asian mainland .7 This suggests that "security" is the prime consideration of 
Bangkok's foreign policy.
Within Asean, Indonesia and Malaysia have different perspectives from 
that of Thailand with regard to Thai-Chinese security ties. They see China as a 
greater threat to Southeast Asia than Vietnam. According to Kuala Lumpur and 
Jakarta, the greater the role played by China in Southeast Asia, the greater the 
danger the region is going to face. Indonesia is, however, more apprehensive of
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Sino-Thai military ties than Malaysia. Malaysia will have less objection to such 
relationship if Thailand's security is a cause of concern.
Thailand, therefore, faces a dilemma. If it is concerned with the unity of 
Asean, it must be careful about moving closer to Beijing. This would affect 
Thailand's security ties with China which are essential in restraining the 
Vietnamese threat. On the contrary, if Bangkok chooses Beijing and neglects 
Asean, it will lack the diplomatic support needed to campaign for international 
approval of its Kampuchean policy. This may also antagonise some Asean 
countries, especially Indonesia and Malaysia. It may lead to a breakdown of the 
regional organisation with Indonesia and Malaysia on one side and the rest on the 
other. This may be a prime consideration of Thailand in upholding the 
commitment to Asean in its declaratory policy. It is in the interest of Bangkok to 
have China as a security guarantor while preserving Asean's unity.
2. Other Asean Members’ Perspectives
2.1 Indonesian perceptions of Thai-Chinese security relationship
Indonesian perceptions of Thai-Chinese security ties are mainly a product 
of Jakarta's perceived China threat.8 The Indonesian perceptions have centred 
around two major issues. One is Thailand's policy on the Kampuchean problem 
and its connection with China, and the other is other kinds of Thai-Chinese 
military cooperation.
A. The Kampuchean problem
Although Asean succeeded in campaigning for international support to 
pressure Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea, the Asean countries 
themselves do not have a unified position. The Indonesian attitude towards the 
Kampuchean problem is based on the concept of regional resilience9, its concept 
of ZOPFAN10, and its perception of China and the Soviet Union as threats. What 
Indonesia has in common with Thailand and other Asean members is the concern 
over Vietnamese control of Kampuchea and the threat to Thailand. What makes
38
the Indonesian view differ from Thailand's position is its attitudes toward 
Vietnam, China and the means of settling the dispute.
The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea contradicts the concept of 
ZOPFAN and regional resilience which serves as the basis of Indonesian foreign 
policy. The violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of other nations 
would undermine stability within Southeast Asia and regional resilience. The 
acceptance of the Vietnamese fait accompli would set a precedent for similar 
actions in the region. What makes it worse is that if Indonesia did not fully 
oppose the action, other countries in Southeast Asia will feel suspicious of 
Indonesia, especially, with regard to its invasion of East Timor. This would 
invite external involvement as its smaller neighbours might establish defence 
connections with great powers to deter possible Indonesian aggression. The 
special meeting of Asean Foreign Ministers in Bangkok on 12 January 1979 
reflected the common security concern of the Asean countries. At that time, the 
solidarity and cohesiveness of Asean was reached with regard to its stance on the 
basic issues of the Kampuchean problem - the opposition to Vietnamese armed 
intervention into Kampuchea, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea, 
the right to self-determination of the Kampuchean people and the role of the 
United Nations in restoring peace in that country.11
Indonesia, however, does not object to Vietnamese interests and its role in 
Kampuchea. Indonesia, as an island state away from mainland Southeast Asia 
does not see Vietnam as a threat. In the view of Indonesian leaders, Vietnam is 
not an expansionist state and it will not go further beyond Indochina.12 Both 
Vietnam and Indonesia also shared experiences in gaining their independence 
through guerrilla struggle against their respective colonial powers. The 
Vietnamese action was similar to the Indonesian takeover of East Timor whose 
action brought condemnation from the international community.13 Moreover, 
because Indonesia perceives China as the greatest threat to the region, it also 
believes that Vietnam could serve as a countervailing force. Indonesia sees that 
the Vietnamese alliance with the Soviet Union conflicted with Vietnam's 
nationalism. This entente is "out of character for independent-minded Vietnam 
and is of a temporary nature".14 This view is contrary to that of Singapore and
39
the dominant political groups in Thailand who see Vietnam as an expansionist 
power supported by the Soviet Union. For the latter, to keep the Vietnamese at 
bay non-communist Southeast Asia must form a Western and Chinese anti-Soviet 
front. China is not an immediate threat but a contributing factor in countering the 
imminent threat from Vietnam.
Indonesia does not agree with the Thai-Chinese support of the Khmer 
Rouge (KR). Firstly, it would delay the long-term settlement of the conflict as the 
fighting would continue and Vietnam would have good reasons to maintain its 
troops in Kampuchea. Secondly, Indonesia perceives this cooperation and the 
continuing problem would push Thailand closer to China and the Chinese 
influence would be increased. When China is perceived as a major threat its 
increasing role would be unacceptable and would destroy the Asean effort for 
regional resilience. The future role of the Khmer Rouge after the Vietnamese 
withdrawal is another problem as Asean states still cannot reach an agreement on 
this topic. Indonesia and Malaysia perceive the Khmer Rouge as an extension of 
Chinese influence. In fact, Thailand is a reluctant supporter of the Khmer Rouge. 
There is every prospect that thousands of armed K.R. guerillas might permanently 
settle along the Thai-Kampuchean border if they are left out of any future political 
settlement. Unfortunately, political support from Asean is not enough to pressure 
Vietnam into withdrawing from Kampuchea. Support for the Khmer Rouge was 
a "necessary evil" for the Thais.
Indonesia's main concern was to stop the polarisation of the region on 
which the competing interest of great powers is based. It wants to see the end of 
the Kampuchean conflict as soon as possible by accommodating Asean interests 
with those of Vietnam. This effort has caused a rift within Asean. One of the 
most critical Indonesian initiatives to prevent the polarisation of the region 
(between Asean and the Indochinese states) was the "Kuantan Principle". The 
meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn and President 
Suharto of Indonesia in Kuantan, Malaysia during 26-27 March 1980 was a sign 
of frustration on the part of Indonesia and Malaysia concerning Asean's policy of 
resolving the Kampuchean conflict. Both countries perceived that Vietnam should 
be provided with an alternative to break with Soviet alliance to avoid succumbing
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to "China's grip".15 Hussein and Suharto disagreed with the Chinese strategy to 
"bleed Vietnam" to force it to negotiate a political settlement on Kampuchean 
problem. They viewed that protracted war might weaken Vietnam so that it would 
become subject to greater Soviet influence. The alternative proposed by Hussein 
and Suharto was a partial withdrawal of Vietnamese forces in return for Asean's 
recognition of the Heng Samrin's regime.16 The Kuan tan formula differed from 
the UN Resolution supported by Asean on 14 November 197917, and was 
rejected by Singapore and Thailand. A Malaysia-Singapore joint statement during 
Hussein's visit to Singapore reflected the Malaysian exclusion of the Kuantan 
principle giving in to Singapore's hardline policy on Kampuchea:
The two prime ministers agreed that an early solution should be found and 
that it should be based on the resolution adopted by the 34th session of the 
UN General Assembly held on November 14, 1979, and the Asean-EEC 
statement on political issues of March 7, 1980.18
Thailand and Singapore also reaffirmed their position regarding the UN 
resolution, agreeing that "efforts must be sustained to preserve the legitimacy of 
the government of Democratic Kampuchea as well as its rightful representation at 
the UN."19
Another sign of Indonesian frustration with Asean (with Thailand and 
Singapore in particular) was a surprise unofficial visit to Vietnam by Armed 
Forces Commander, Gen. Benny Moerdani, and the Director of the Centre of 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)20, Jusuf Wanandi, in February 1984. 
This was the first visit by senior member of Asean Governments to Hanoi since 
1980 without prior Asean consultation.21 Moerdani was reported as saying 
"some countries say that Vietnam is a threat to Southeast Asia but the Indonesian 
Army and people do not believe it" and the Vietnamese action in Kampuchea is "a 
question of survival" aimed at defending itself from a Chinese threat.22 Although 
this was an unofficial visit, it certainly affected Asean since Moerdani is a high- 
ranking official in the Indonesian government and his view contradicted that of 
Thailand and Singapore.
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There had been other events demonstrating the conflicting views of 
Indonesia and Thailand. A proposed cocktail party as agreed by Vietnam during 
Mochtar's visit to Ho Chi Minh City in June 1987 was rebuffed by other Asean 
members especially Thailand. His initiative to organize an informal meeting of the 
CGDK and Heng Samrin's Government "on the basis of equal footing, without 
preconditions and with no political label"23 was seen by Bangkok as indifferent to 
the real problem - the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Bangkok and 
Singapore claimed that Jakarta had fallen into a Vietnamese trap as the agreed 
meeting between Heng Samrin's regime on equal footing with the CGDK was 
equal to recognition of the Vietnamese puppet.
Bangkok insisted that the Vietnamese invasion was the root cause of the 
problem, therefore, it must participate in the dialogue with the CGDK. In the 
Asean foreign ministers' special meeting in Bangkok on 16 August 1987 
Bangkok pressed Indonesia and other Asean members to alter the proposal by 
adding the preconditions that Vietnam must join the party immediately after the 
Khmers had started talking instead of "at a later stage" as in the old proposal and 
that the CGDK's eight-point proposal be the basis for discussion.24 The hardline 
policy of Bangkok aroused resentment within Indonesia, especially among the 
military, government-controlled media and, to a lesser extent, the Foreign 
Ministry. In response to the Thai policy, an editorial in the Jakarta Post on 19 
August 1987 suggested that Indonesia should protect its national interests while 
Bangkok had pursued that of its own. It stated:
The Bangkok talks, it seems to us, is a warning signal for Indonesia that it 
is high time to spell out clearly to our ASEAN partners, as the largest 
archipelagic state in Southeast Asia with a growing national interest to 
protect, we simply cannot afford the endless prolonging of the Kampuchean 
conflict.
It is not that we envy Thailand that has apparently managed to turn its role 
as a front-line state in the Kampuchean conflict into a profitable business.
But Thailand's willingness to accommodate the increasing role of China, 
which shows no urgency in seeking a Kampuchean solution, in mainland 
Southeast Asia thereby stimulating the increased presence of other extra 
regional powers, is simply worrisome for Indonesia.25
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Indonesian discontent with Thailand's Kampuchean policy has been 
reduced after Chatichai Choonhavan's Government was elected in July 1988. His 
policy to resume economic ties with the Indochinese states and make contact with 
Phnom Penh was welcomed by Jakarta. The visit to Hanoi by ACM Siddhi 
Savetsila in 1988, and the visit to Bangkok by Hun Sen, Phnom Penh's leader, in 
early 1989 were praised by Jakarta as favourable developments in resolving the 
prolonged conflict. The Jakarta Post on 12 January 1989 noted that Chatichai's 
planned meeting with Hun Sen was "a helpful hint in which direction the 
resourceful Thai diplomacy is heading in its subtle efforts to nudge the formation 
of a post-settlement Kampuchean government".
B. Thai-Chinese military ties
For Jakarta, the closer the ties between China and Thailand, the greater the 
influence China could gain in Southeast Asia. One of the most critical decisions 
in the Sino-Thai military cooperation was the controversial agreement to establish 
a War Reserve Stockpile in Thailand. This is a cause of concern for the Asean 
countries including Vietnam in that it might provoke Vietnam and lead Hanoi to 
ask for further military aid from Moscow.26 This would push Hanoi further into 
total dependence on the Soviet Union instead of providing it an opportunity to 
become more neutral. Moreover, there is a possibility that arms in the Chinese 
Stockpile could be offered to the Khmer Rouge. It would prolong the 
Kampuchean conflict - a most unwelcome development for Jakarta. Indonesia as 
well as Malaysia are also concerned that China might use Thailand as a 
springboard for its international arms trade.27 Huge arms purchases by Thailand 
may set a precedent for other developing countries who might also turn to China 
for arms. It is possible that China might ask Thailand to be an agent in selling its 
arms to other developing states. Future arms production in Thailand with Chinese 
technology would also lead into this direction.
Indonesia is quite astonished with the continuing development of Sino- 
Thai security ties. As Thailand's economy is booming and a prospect of reaching 
a solution on the Kampuchean problem arises, Jakarta sees no reason why
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Bangkok should continue to identify with Beijing. An editorial comment in The 
Jakarta Post expressed its disappointment with this as follows:
The setting up of military stockpiles with Chinese assistance by stressing 
again that Thailand is a "frontline state" will have precisely the very effect 
of prolonging the prevailing of a battle-front situation in mainland 
Southeast Asia. This action is not conducive at all to achieving peace.
It will also strengthen China's leverage to achieve a de facto veto power in 
rejecting any solution not to give up its military assistance to the Khmer 
Rouge by using Thailand as its conduit.28
The Indonesian concepts of regional resilience and ZOPF AN are also 
major reasons for opposing Sino-Thai military ties. The de facto security 
alignment between Bangkok and Beijing would polarise Southeast Asia as other 
countries would have to continue relying on greater power to counterbalance 
China. Countries like Indonesia and Malaysia which are suspicious of China see 
a US presence in the region as desirable to maintain the balance of power. As a 
result, Indonesia has asked the United States to maintain its military presence in 
Southeast Asia (on a temporary basis), to continue the sale of arms to Asean 
countries and to use its leverage to prevent the Soviet Union and China from 
further expanding their influence into the rest of Southeast Asia.29
Although Indonesia did not agree with Sino-Thai military ties and 
Bangkok's hard-line attitude towards Vietnam, it tried not to criticize Bangkok 
openly nor to push Thailand too hard. One reason is that Jakarta or Asean could 
not offer Thailand security as provided by Beijing against the Vietnamese threat. 
The second reason is that Indonesia was concerned about maintaining the unity of 
Asean. If Thailand chooses to neglect Asean and ally more with the Chinese, 
Asean could not maintain its viability as Indonesia would probably totally 
dominate Asean. Singapore always feels suspicious of its powerful neighbour. 
Indonesia also used to be a hostile neighbour of Malaysia. The Muslim 
domination of Asean would also alienate the Filipinos. Therefore, Asean would 
break up inevitably.
In addition, Indonesia felt that it was an important founding member of 
Asean. Asean was created as a viable organisation by the changed orientation of 
Indonesian foreign policy. In a sense it was "a by-product of Indonesian
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Confrontation".30 Asean was established in 1967 after Suharto agreed in 1966 
that a "United South East Asia" could be established to promote regional 
cooperation, economic, technical and cultural ties.31 Therefore, a sense of 
belonging also limits an Indonesian response that would certainly create a severe 
rift with in Asean. Moreover, Indonesia expects a similar sense of belonging 
from Thailand, a commitment by Bangkok to the unity of the organisation. 
Indonesia expects that when the Vietnamese threat abates and the Kampuchean 
problem improves Thai-Chinese security ties will diminish.
2.2 The Malaysian perspective
Malaysia, like Indonesia, perceives China as its major long-term threat. 
The racial problem between the ethnic Chinese and the Malays and the Chinese 
insistence on party-to-party relations and moral support for the Communist Party 
of Malaya (CPM) led Malaysia to regard China as a major threat.32 The Chinese 
limited war with Vietnam in February 1979 following Vietnam’s purge of the 
overseas Chinese and its invasion of Kampuchea further alarmed Malaysia. 
Perceptions of the China threat, however, are less intense in Malaysia than in 
Indonesia because "GESTAPU was more recent, more traumatic, and more 
dramatic than the twelve-year Emergency" 33
Malaysian attitudes towards Thailand's relations with China and the Thai 
Kampuchean policy have varied from time to time depending on two major 
considerations. First, the Malaysian perspective reflects concern over the China 
threat and its benign attitude toward Vietnam. Second, Malaysia is concerned 
with Thailand's security and its implications for Malaysia itself.34
Malaysian perceptions of Sino-Thai security relations are somewhat 
similar to those of Indonesia but in some degree come closer to those of Bangkok. 
ZOPF AN is a cornerstone in Malaysian foreign policy as well as the basis of its 
approach towards Thai-Chinese security ties. The current Malaysian 
interpretation of ZOPF AN is a situation in which no major power has a dominant 
military role in the region. A balanced relationship between Asean and each major 
power is desirable. As long as there are competing interests between major
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powers in the region, a balanced role of those competing powers is still necessary 
to keep the regional balance. The highest goal is to achieve a neutral Southeast 
Asia to the exclusion of external-power intervention. When Thailand's security 
was at risk Malaysia understood the Thai move to acquire Chinese protection.
With increasing Chinese influence in the region as well as Thai-Chinese 
security ties, Malaysia has seen the Soviet Union as a countervailing force to 
China. However, the Soviet Union is also a source of threat too. Malaysia has, 
hence, tilted more towards the West as it prefers the US presence to check the 
Soviet Union and China.
As the situation has turned against Vietnam, Malaysia sees little reason for 
Bangkok to remain in a closed strategic alignment with Beijing. Nevertheless, 
other related issues must be considered with regard to the future of Asean's unity. 
Malaysia is Thailand's neighbour and cannot deny the necessity of friendly 
relations. Security cooperation over the border between the two states is crucial to 
peace along their common border. Thailand cannot afford to be hostile to 
Malaysia and Indonesia by maintaining an alliance with Beijing - a situation that 
would result in the collapse of Asean. Neither can Malaysia allow the erosion of 
Asean and ZOPFAN as it would drive Thailand into strengthening its military 
alliance with Beijing. Therefore, diplomatic shrewdness is required for Thailand 
in dealing with Indonesia and Malaysia.
2.2 The other Asean countries' perspectives
The perspectives of Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei are common: 
the unity of Asean is the most desirable thing. These three countries do not 
perceive China as a major threat, but the collapse of Asean will affect their own 
security and stability. The existence of Asean as a viable regional organisation is 
the first priority of their foreign policies.
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Singaporean perceptions
With regard to the Thai-Chinese security relations, Singapore is a staunch 
hard-liner in supporting Thai-Chinese Kampuchean policy. The Singaporean 
perception on this issue is described clearly by Chin Kin Wah.
Singapore's threat perceptions relate to external challenge that could upset a 
prevailing balance of power and influence that is favourable to itself. In 
this respect, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, backed by Soviet 
power, has added to the external threats perceived by Singapore and led it to 
identify more closely with Thai security interests. At the same time, the 
consideration of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and its spin-offs, in the 
form of a steady modernization of Vietnam's air force and the growing 
activities of Soviet military air-craft based in Vietnam, have increased 
Singapore's sense of vulnerability with respect to air defence.35
An example of a potential air attack was the defection in November 1979 
of a Vietnamese pilot who landed an airplane in the republic without much 
warning.36 Another major explanation of Singapore's adamant line against the 
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea is the fear of the precedent that would be 
established for great power relations with small states. The changing balance of 
power in the region and the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia also affect 
Singapore as its interest is to maintain the regional balance of power, to secure its 
economic development which is crucial to political and social stability. 
Singapore, like Thailand during the Prem Government, believed that the key to 
any solution on the Kampuchean problem has been the Soviet Union. Singapore 
has supported dialogue between Asean countries and Moscow to press Hanoi to 
be more flexible and to compromise with Asean and the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Singapore has never softened its hardline 
attitude towards the Hun Sen government.
Although Singapore is a consistent supporter of Thailand's Kampuchean 
policy and Thai-Chinese cooperation on this issue, it disagrees with increasing 
Sino-Thai military ties. It saw that the Vietnamese threat was decreasing as its 
troops were preparing to withdraw from Cambodia and that Thailand was 
economically stronger and politically more stable. This is the time that Bangkok 
should logically be distancing itself from Beijing. Thailand, as an Asean member, 
should consult with other Asean partners over military agreements with China
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such as the establishment of the War Reserve Stockpile.37 This reflects 
Singapore's view that it does not want growing Chinese influence in Thailand 
which might affect the balance of power in the region. Singapore also avoids 
identification of its interest with China for fear of Indonesian and Malaysian 
suspicion. It will, therefore, be the last country in Asean to normalise its 
diplomatic ties with Beijing.
This attitude, however, does not suggest that China is perceived as a 
major threat to Singapore. It regards all major powers in terms of a potential 
destabilisation of regional balance of power and the unity of Asean. Singapore 
fears that Sino-Thai military ties will increase Chinese influence into the region as 
compared with those of the US. It is also concerned about Indonesian and 
Malaysian attitudes towards China.
The Perceptions of the Philippines and Brunei
Both countries regard Asean as a cornerstone of their foreign policies. 
Greater emphasis upon Asean resulted in the renunciation by the Philippines of its 
claim to Sabah at the Kuala Lumpur Conference Asean Summit 1977. The 
Philippines is a strong supporter of Asean policy on the Kampuchean problem. 
Thai-Chinese security ties do not invite a negative response from Manila. One 
reason is that the Philippines might not be affected by the relationship as it is 
distant from Thailand and China and its concern with domestic issues is of 
primary importance. The Philippines is far less suspicious of China than 
Indonesia and Malaysia. The ethnic Chinese in the Philippines also have fewer 
problems with assimilation.38 As a tiny state, Brunei also gives much value to 
Asean. Historical fear of Indonesia and Malaysia can be a reason for Brunei's 
opposition to the Vietnamese invasion of its neighbouring country. The situation 
in Indochina and Thai-Chinese security ties are not a security concern for Brunei.
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3. Conclusion
The current Thai-Chinese security relationship rather perplexes Indonesia 
and Malaysia, and Singapore to a lesser degree. The predominant Chinese role in 
the Kampuchean problem and increasing Chinese influence in the region as a 
result of Sino-Thai military cooperation are incompatible with Indonesia and 
Malaysia's regional resilience and their understanding of ZOPFAN. This issue 
would certainly affect the unity of Asean as the interests of Thailand and those of 
Indonesia and Malaysia are not always compatible. Ironically, the current level of 
cooperation of Sino-Thai security ties is unlikely to lead to a collapse of Asean. 
The reason is that Asean is more valuable to Indonesia, Malaysia and other Asean 
states than any disagreement over Thai-Chinese relations.
For Indonesia, Asean is a means of bringing regional cohesion that would 
minimise great power involvement. If Asean collapses it is still unlikely that Thai- 
Chinese relations would slacken, on the contrary, they would be enhanced. 
Asean also allays Indonesian concern that Singapore would seek an external 
alliance or would become a fifth column for China. As Indonesia needs 
modernisation, Asean provides a kind of regional stability and security that 
attracts foreign investment and markets. The unanimity rule of Asean is an 
incentive for Indonesian and other member states to stay in the organisation.
For Malaysia, Asean would prevent Indonesia's military expansion by 
satisfying Jakarta's desire for regional preeminence.39 Asean further contributes 
some ground rules to peace and unity: non-interference in internal affairs; pacific 
settlement of disputes; respect for independence; and territorial integrity.40 Dato 
Musa Hitam, a former Malaysian Deputy Premier, even pointed out that Asean 
today is already a ZOPFAN (except the Philippines) since it enables the 
achievement of zone of peace, area of amity and community of friendship among 
the six states.41
For Singapore Asean provides an opportunity to associate with larger and 
more powerful neighbours on an equal basis. Asean can assure the island
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republic against possible domination or annexation by bigger states.42 This 
reason is enough to make Asean crucial to Singapore's survival.
One event that could disrupt Asean as a viable regional organization is a 
future military alliance between Thailand and China. Such an alliance will 
confirm Indonesian and Malaysian views of the China threat. If China could use 
Thailand as its base to project military power into the region, the unity of Asean 
will mean less for the other Asean states. However, this circumstance is unlikely 
considering the current situation in the region. The future relationship between 
Bangkok and Beijing will depend on future changes in the regional balance of 
power, that may result from the US withdrawal from the Philippines, the situation 
in Indochina, Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and Sino-Vietnamese relations. (These 
are discussed in chapter 4.)
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CHAPTER 4
SINO-THAI SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IN THE 1990s
The current bilateral relationship between Bangkok and Beijing is regarded 
as flourishing. Other Asean countries are very concerned as to whether Sino-Thai 
security ties will expand into the 1990s. This raises the question of what are the 
factors which will shape the future Sino-Thai security relationship and what kind 
of relationship this will be in future. This chapter considers these determinants 
affecting future security ties between the two states. The major factors are: first, 
relations between Thailand and the Indochinese states; second, the Thai military 
modernisation program; third, China's South China Sea policy; and fourth, the 
changing regional balance of power.
Relations between Thailand and the Indochinese states are determined by 
Thailand's foreign policy under Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan and the 
prospect of a settlement of the Kampuchean problem. This policy is based on the 
future of Thai domestic politics. If friendly ties between these states could be 
restored through the continuing of current policy, Bangkok will eliminate the 
immediate threat from Vietnam, although a medium to long-term one might still 
persist. This factor might give Bangkok less reason to bolster security ties with 
Beijing to counter the long-term Vietnamese threat.
The Thai military modernisation program is being implemented under 
General Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh's supervision. Reduced military assistance 
from the United States drives the Thai military to China for arms because it offers 
long-term credits and better conditions than the West. The increasing business- 
orientation of the Thai military also foreshadows a prospect of developing an arms 
industry by way of joint arms production with China. This might bring closer 
security ties between the two nations.
Another major factor is future relations between Asean and China. Future 
potential conflicts in the South China Sea in relation to overlapping territorial 
claims between China and coastal states will have great repercussions for Asean 
as the China threat will be seen as a reality. The expansion by the PRC of its
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maritime capability will prepare China for offensive operations in Southeast Asia 
if it desires to. Thailand, as an Asean member, will be pressured by other 
members to review its ties with Beijing if this kind of conflict occurs. Each of 
these determinants of Thai-Chinese relations will be considered in turn.
The changing regional balance of power will determine the state of 
relations among the regional states. The US commitment to Thailand and its 
presence in Southeast Asia will preserve the status quo in the region. Conversely, 
if the US role is declining, it will encourage Bangkok to maintain good ties with 
Beijing. The Soviet policy towards Asean and Vietnam is a matter of concern too. 
Possible reduced Soviet support for Vietnam will change the regional balance in 
favour of Thailand and Asean. As a consequence, Asean-Soviet relations are 
likely to be improved. Japanese defense activities in the region might drive some 
states to seek security ties with other powers. Sino-US, Sino-Soviet, and Sino- 
Vietnamese relations also affect the regional balance which is an important 
consideration in determining Thailand's foreign policy and Thai relations with 
China.
1. Thailand's Relations with the Indochinese States
As the Sino-Thai security relationship was generated by perceptions of the 
Vietnam threat, future relations between Thailand and Indochina will more or less 
affect future Sino-Thai security ties. The future Thai-Indochinese ties depend on 
Thai foreign policy under Chatichai and a settlement of the Kampuchean problem.
1.1 The Thai foreign policy under Chatichai's administration
The election in July 1988 marked a significant change in Thai politics. 
Chatichai Choonhavan is the first elected Prime Minister in 12 years. His military 
and diplomatic experience offer him an opportunity to initiate a boldly new foreign 
policy while retaining good ties with the military. The most dramatic change in 
Thai foreign policy under Chatichai's administration occurred over the 
Kampuchean issue and relations with the other two Indochinese States. During
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the policy announcement of the cabinet on 25 August 1988, Chatichai pointed out 
that Thailand will
promote economic and political relations with neighbouring states by 
expanding trade and improving good understanding and friendship. This is 
to create peaceful co-existence and unanimity resulting in common interests 
between each other. . . .1
This policy does not separate the relations between Indochinese states 
from relations with other neighbouring states. This suggests that Thailand will no 
longer regard the Indochinese states as Thailand's hostile neighbours. Moreover, 
the economic relationship is accorded priority over security concerns given that 
the Vietnamese were expected to withdraw their forces from Kampuchea by late 
1989.
This policy initiative was later highlighted by Chatichai's announcement to 
turn Indochina from a "battlefield' into a "marketplace". This policy is a dramatic 
change from the hard-line policy towards the Indochinese states pursued by Prime 
Minister Prem's administration. The new initiative is intended to fulfil two 
objectives. One is to expand trade and tourism between Thailand and the three 
Indochinese states to maintain the economic growth and development of Thailand 
by seeking raw materials for Thai manufacturers at the same time as finding new 
markets for Thai manufactured goods. The other objective is to use economic 
benefit as a means to resolve political problems. This aim was explained by M.R. 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra, a former adviser to the Prime Minister, that "Economics 
is a great healer, and we may then see real prospects for settling the Kampuchean 
conflict".2
There are four major reasons for the change in Thai foreign policy. First, 
the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations means a future change in world politics 
and regional conflicts in Indochina.3 Second, Chatichai's diplomatic experience 
and spirit of compromise have influenced the new foreign policy.4 The third 
reason is the economic factor. It is a major incentive for Thailand to improve its 
relations with the Indochinese states to find new sources of raw-materials like 
timber, minerals, jewels, and fish.5 The last important driving force behind the 
new foreign policy comes from the Prime Minister's advisers.6
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1.2  The settlement of the Kampuchean problem and Sino-Thai 
Chinese security relations
The new foreign policy initiative of Chatichai is primarily intended to 
resolve the Kampuchean problem by offering economic benefits as an incentive to 
Vietnam and Kampuchea. Hun Sen's visit to Bangkok was a major adjustment to 
Thailand's Kampuchean policy. Thailand believes that an economic incentive 
offered to Indochina will finally turn Kampuchea into more open and friendly 
country and good ties with Vietnam would be established.
A Kampuchean settlement will have two significant implications. First, it 
will eliminate the greatest immediate threat to Thailand's security. Since the end 
of 1978 the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea have constituted the greatest threat 
in the eyes of the Thai military. Second, it would lead to an improvement in Thai- 
Vietnamese and Thai-Cambodian relations. This is because Vietnam will need 
peace to rebuild its ruined economy devastated by wars. This fact, nevertheless, 
does not suggest a change in the Thai perception of the Vietnamese threat and of 
its potential competitor in mainland Southeast Asia. The threat will remain but 
will not materialise in the short- and possibly medium-term.
An improvement in relations between Thailand and Vietnam as proposed 
by Chatichai would serve as one important factor in determining future Sino-Thai 
security ties. If future Thai relations with Indochina improve, Thailand may not 
need China as an immediate security guarantor. Therefore, a formal military 
alliance between Bangkok and Beijing will be ruled out. The lack of need for 
China as a security patron might lead to a lessening of Sino-Thai security ties.
Nevertheless, if Thailand can find a new area of security co-operation with 
China entailing common interests but not affecting the improving ties with 
Indochina, Sino-Thai security ties will be maintained at least at the current level. 
Chatichai and Gen. Chaovalit have an answer to this problem. The 
"Suwannaphume" or "Golden Land" concept was introduced by Gen. Chaovalit 
on 25 January 1989 and Gen. Pat Akkanibutr, the Deputy Supreme Commander, 
on 9 February the same year. The idea is to turn the Southeast Asian peninsular
into a prosperous land by developing "economic cooperation, solidarity and 
prosperity in this Suwannaphume with Thailand at its centre".7 The idea includes 
Burma and Indochina and Thailand. The idea is a means to project Thailand as 
the sub-region's economic centre in the future. Thailand will serve as the bridge 
to bring Asean and the countries in Suwannaphume together.8 This concept 
parallels Chatichai's policy of turning "Indochina from a battlefield into a 
marketplace".
The Suwannaphume desire will be achieved only if China does not object 
because it might change the future regional balance in the Southeast Asian 
mainland which is a strategic point for China. History reveals that China would 
not allow any single Southeast Asian state to have a dominant role in the region. 
In this case, China would like to see a balance of power in the region which 
allows Beijing to maintain its influence. Therefore, if Bangkok raises its profile 
in the region and serves as a centre of Suwannaphume, it could do so only in 
collaboration with Beijing. This means a quid pro quo between maintaining the 
security alignment with China and providing Beijing an access into Southeast Asia 
via Thailand on the one hand, and a greater regional role for Bangkok on the 
other.
Although the future success of Suwannaphume is a matter of conjecture, it 
will not affect the developing bilateral relationship between Bangkok and Beijing. 
Efforts are being made to raise Thailand's profile in regional economic and 
political activities. This trend will be increasing as a consequence of Thailand's 
growing economic and political interactions with the Indochinese states. If 
Suwannaphume is no longer mentioned by Thai leaders, it does not mean that the 
idea will not be implemented.
2. The Military Connection
The military ties between Bangkok and Beijing involve arms purchases, 
logistics supplies, the future establishment of a war reserve stockpile and a 
planned joint arms production as discussed in chapter 3. As the military is a 
dominant actor in Thai politics, the military's perception of the advantage of
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further bolstering military ties with China will be an important factor in 
maintaining or even promoting security relations with Beijing in the next decade. 
From the military viewpoint, Sino-Thai military cooperation will benefit Thailand 
by: first, helping the Thai military modernisation program while US military 
assistance has steadily been reduced; second, creating an arms business for 
military circles through Sino-Thai joint ventures.
Chinese arms have played an important role in upgrading Thailand's 
military capability and weapons modernisation program. When Gen. Chaovalit 
became the Army Commander a few years ago (and later the acting-Supreme 
Commander at the same time), he set out a grand scheme that modernised mobile 
military units must be established in the near future to respond to threats from the 
West (Burmese border) and the East (from Indochina). This requires increased 
deliveries of weapons for the three services in "varying degree, shape and 
nature", yet US security assistance for Thailand has been reduced considerably 
(see also Appendix A).9
The military modernisation program is being implemented while Vietnam 
is unable to maintain its military strength and is actually reducing the size of its 
armed forces. This will make Thailand more secure in the future when its military 
capability is not much different from that of Vietnam. It will also support a 
greater role for Thailand in the next decade. Although the United States has 
abolished the FMS to Thailand this fiscal year (1989), Chatichai said that this 
posed no problem because Thailand could find alternative sources of military 
hardware.10 He meant that China can supply relatively cheap weapons and its 
favourable concessions have enabled the military to achieve its modernisation 
program. The second cavalry division of the Army is a good example of a 
modernised military unit using Chinese arms. The T69II tanks and APCs from 
China have been deployed together with M48 A5 tanks and 17 M109 A5 155-mm 
Howitzers from the United States.11
The arms business is the other major incentive for the Thai military to 
enhance its security ties with China. The planned joint venture between Narinco 
of China and the Thai military to manufacture APCs and tank components (such
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as rollers for Chinese tanks (T-69s) of China and Leopard tanks from West 
Germany) in Thailand for domestic use and possible export12 will lead to a new 
era in Sino-Thai military relations. Thailand has already purchased approximately 
900 APCs and more than 50 T-69II tanks from China. The production of such 
arms in Thailand will be beneficial both in terms of reduced costs of production 
and reduced costs of logistics supplies of the arms components. An APC 
produced in Thailand would cost A$ 15,000 but several million dollars if 
manufactured in the United States.13
One reason behind the joint venture with China is an attempt to avoid 
excessive dependence upon that country for arms supplies. China is still 
perceived as a long-term threat and may change its policy towards Bangkok in the 
future. As a result, China may cancel supplies of arms spare parts to Thailand 
and, thus, local production will guarantee a consistent supply of arms to the Thai 
military. The joint arms venture will satisfy the need to reduce dependence on 
China for arms purchases and will assist the Thai military's modernisation 
program. If future Thai-Chinese conflicts occur resulting in the severing of 
Chinese assistance, Thailand will have facilities and a certain level of technology 
needed to produce arms spare parts. This was Gen. Chaovalit's implicit answer 
when he responded to public concern that Thailand was becoming too dependent 
on China.
"We are always aware of the ramifications and consequences of purchasing 
Chinese weapons. However, we assessed that the US would never make a 
comeback in Indo-China and therefore, we cannot afford to rely on the 
United States - or any other single country - any longer. What we should 
do is to try to build viable, self-reliant defence strength for our country." 14
Future arms production and possible arms exports by Thailand might be 
associated with the "Suwannaphume" ideal. A slight difference between 
Chatichai and Chaovalit's concept is the focus on economic power for the former 
but on sub-regional military leadership for the latter. The status of arms producer 
and exporter will raise the Thai military profile among prospective buyers and will 
enable it to have an active role in the region. The visits of Chaovalit to Indochina 
and Burma suggests an increasing regional as well as an international role for the 
Thai military leadership. The recent suggestion of Gen. Chaovalit to the
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Australian Chief of Defence Forces, Peter Gration, to co-organise an international 
conference of military leaders of twelve Asian-Pacific nations15 may reflect the 
changing role of the Thai military. If that is the case, military ties with Beijing are 
a means of seeking China's approval and endorsement.
3. The Regional Balance of Power
A changing regional balance of power in Southeast Asia will be an 
important factor in determining Thai foreign policy and its relationship with the 
great powers. The most likely events that would affect the regional balance and 
which will have great consequences for the Sino-Thai security relationship are the 
withdrawal of the US military presence from Southeast Asia and the development 
of Sino-Asean and Sino-Vietnamese ties.
3.1 The US presence in Southeast Asia
For non-communist countries in Southeast Asia, the US military presence 
in the Philippines is crucial for the regional balance as it symbolises the US 
commitment to the region. It also serves as a restraint on Japan, the PRC, the 
Soviet Union as it prevents any one power from becoming predominant in the 
region.16
While the US interest in Asia-Pacific region has increased in the 1980s 
and will continue to do so beyond the year 2000 because of increasing trade 
transactions with the Pacific, US military power in the region, especially in 
Southeast Asia is expected to decline. A major reason is the huge US trade and 
budget deficits requiring cuts in military spending and burden-sharing with allies. 
The other reason is the uncertain future of the military facilities in the Philippines. 
The US military facilities are likely to be phased out or relocated elsewhere after 
the military bases agreement (MBA) expires in 1991.17
A withdrawal of US military presence from Southeast Asia will make non­
communist Southeast Asian countries worried about the Soviet military presence 
in Vietnam. If the United States disperses its facilities to many countries, the
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United States will lack geographical advantages and the ability to respond rapidly. 
For example, the technical fighter and transport wings based at Guam and ship 
maintenance facilities at Yokosuka cannot maintain the US strategic superiority in 
the South China Sea. China and Japan might expand their military power into the 
region. If the United States encourages China or Japan to extend their influence 
to counter the Soviet expansion, Southeast Asian states might change their 
security alignment because of different threat perceptions within the region. For 
instance, Thailand might be leaning more toward China or Japan as Beijing 
becomes a predominant regional power. In contrast, Malaysia and Indonesia 
might establish Asean maritime defence cooperation to safeguard the area from the 
intervention by the major powers.
3.2 Sino-Asean relations
It is China's growing naval strength and evolution of a "blue water" navy
that poses the greatest risk of instability in Asia.18
As discussed in chapter 3, some Asean countries are concerned with the 
Sino-Thai security relationship. This concern will be heightened when these 
countries experience conflict with China which will transform their view of the 
perceived long-term threat from China into an immediate and real one. A likely 
major conflict between China and Asean countries may arise from the overlap of 
territorial claims in the South China Sea. A possible scenario is that China will 
use its modernised Navy to control the islands and atolls claimed by China as well 
as Vietnam and some Asean states. The use of force by China in March and April 
1988 against Vietnamese maritime forces in some islands of the Spratly group 
alarmed some Asean states such as Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines which 
control some islands in the Spratly group.
Future conflict in the South China Sea is expected as China has 
progressively developed its blue-water Navy as part of the military modernisation 
program. The defence modernisation program is part of the four modernisations 
which aim to turn China into a "world power" of the "first rank" within 60 
years.19 The Navy will deploy long-distance naval ships and amphibious tanks to 
demonstrate its power projection into the Pacific and Indian Ocean.
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For the Chinese Navy, a modernised version of the Nanyang Doctrine has 
been established to guide maritime strategy of maintaining order in the South 
China Sea. The strategy is to deploy sea, land and air power to intimidate or deter 
an attempt by foreign powers who aim to change the status quo in the region.20 
Conflicting claims of sovereignty over the archipelagic islands in the South China 
Sea are the most important stimuli for China's Navy program. These islands 
include the Pratas Group claimed by both China and Taiwan, the Paracels Group 
claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam, Macclesfield Bank claimed by China and 
Taiwan, the Spratly group claimed by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
and Vietnam.
The Chinese Navy build-up in the South China Sea will make it a maritime 
power in the near future. The development plans to be implemented by the end of 
the century include nuclear and conventional submarines, aircraft, and probably 
aircraft carriers.21 This will be in addition to to the present combat strength of 5 
nuclear submarines, 113 conventional submarines, 46 surface combatants and a 
nummber of coastal craft with 350,000 personnel.22 The Chinese Navy today is 
the world's third ranking maritime power. It also has the second strongest naval 
infantry forces and the world largest small ship navy.23 It has been conducting 
reconnaissance and intelligence operations along the Vietnamese coast. The PLA 
Navy has also deployed logistics support for naval air and surface forces to 
conduct anti-ship and submarine warfare exercises throughout the region.24
The Chinese naval build-up in the South China Sea is a major concern for 
littoral states in Southeast Asia. This potential threat, moreover, was being 
confirmed when fighting took place on Vietnamese-controlled islands in March 
1988. This contradicts the PRC's declared position on territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea which are
left over by history and need time to be resolved one by one and step by 
step, and disputes over strait's sovereignty and maritime boundaries should 
be approached through international consultations. ...The dispute areas with 
natural resources...in particular require negotiated settlements....In the case, 
common exploration and sharing of resources, with the problem of 
sovereignty pushed aside for a certain period of time, is a fairly good 
approach.25
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A future conflict between China and Vietnam or China and Asean 
countries over the issue of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea will 
destroy China's commitment to improve its relations with the Asean states. It is 
possible that the littoral states will find a greater need for the US military presence 
in the region to restrain the Chinese adventure. If the United States has to 
withdraw its bases in the Philippines, the situation will be more alarming. The 
Soviet card may gain more weight to counter the Chinese maritime power. Japan 
might be urged to play a role to offset the Chinese power.
A recent consolidation of power by the conservatives in China may be a 
sign that China will initiate more active moves in Southeast Asia. Although Deng 
Xiaoping has regained control of the party and proclaimed continuity of economic 
reforms and has appointed Jiang Zemin as the new party's secretary, the power 
struggle is likely to continue. If the conservatives win in the future power 
struggle, a stronger military role in shaping China's internal and foreign policy 
would be a consequence. Such a prospect would result in China, on the one 
hand, seeking to maintain friendly relations with the Southeast Asian states, but, 
on the other hand, stepping-up its military activities in the South China Sea.
A potential conflict in the South China Sea will present Thailand with a 
real dilemma. If Bangkok does not support Asean and take a common stand 
against China, misgivings from Asean will follow. Indonesia and Malaysia 
would pressure Thailand to reduce its ties with China. If Asean assumes a minor 
role in Thailand's security in the future, Bangkok is likely to pursue a policy of 
appeasement with China. In response to the pro-Beijing Thai policy, Malaysia 
and Indonesia and perhaps the Philippines may form a pan-Malayan union 
pursuing their own common interests reminiscent of MAPHILINDO proposal of 
1963. This concept was based on the fact that Malaysia and Indonesia are 
"closely related in race, language, customs, and the religion of Islam".26
This is one reason why Thailand has never expressed a desire to establish 
a formal military alliance with China. Informal military ties are more appropriate 
because they have no official bondage and do not alarm Thailand's neighbours. 
In fact, Bangkok has put much effort into balancing its relationship with China
t_
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and Asean. Nevertheless increasing security ties between Bangkok and Beijing 
are conceivable due to many advantages Thailand could gain from China. 
Malaysia and Indonesia will be confused if the Kampuchean problem is resolved 
and Sino-Thai security ties continue to develop. The new foreign policy 
initiatives under Chatichai's Government bewilder Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. 
Although they generally welcomed the new Thai foreign policy, Indonesia has 
ambiguous attitudes towards Bangkok.27 What they expect is that Sino-Thai 




Thailand's security relationship with China in the aftermath of the second 
Indochinese War was determined by two significant conditions, namely the 
pattern of Thai foreign policy, and Thai-Chinese mutual security interests. The 
pattern of Thailand's foreign policy indicates that Thailand will pursue 
equidistance and balance-of-interests policies with the major powers when the 
Thais are not faced with a major immediate threat, especially an external one. On 
the other hand, Thailand will find a security guarantor to counter imminent 
external threats - for example, the United States during the 1950s-early 1970s and 
China from 1979 until the present time.
The Sino-Thai security relationship is perceived as a necessity in the 
context of Thailand's foreign policy, which aims to minimise external threats and 
preserve national security. The Vietnamese threat created by the Kampuchean 
problem, frequent Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, and historical hostility 
raised Thailand's security concerns considerably over the last decade. China was 
the only power in providing security protection to Thailand against Vietnamese 
aggression.
As the Sino-Thai security relationship has increased, expanded ties 
generated mutual benefits which have established a new foundation for their 
future relationship. Thai-Chinese military collaboration in supporting Khmer 
resistance forces have institutionalised military ties between the two states. Arms 
transfers and arms purchases create mutual interests on the parts of Sino-Thai 
military circles. Expanded military ties between Thailand and China since the 
middle of the 1980s was an outgrowth of the mutual benefits rather than an 
increase in the Vietnamese threat.
The future security relationship between Thailand and China will likely to 
be influenced by four major determinants - Thailand's future relations with the 
Indochinese states, Thailand's military modernisation program, US military 
presence in the Philippines, and future Sino-Asean relations. Thailand's relations
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with the Indochinese states will improve as a consequence of the Vietnamese 
withdrawal from Kampuchea and the economics-oriented foreign policy of 
Chatichai. Such conditions will eliminate an immediate external threat to Thailand 
at least for the short term. Thus, following the Thai foreign policy practice, 
Thailand does not have to rely on Chinese security protection during the next 
decade because of a lack of a significant external threat.
Such a projection, however, does not consider the Thai perception of 
Vietnam. Even though relations with the Indochinese states will be improved, the 
Thai perceived threat of Vietnam cannot be eliminated following the history of 
hostility and competitiveness. The Vietnamese threat may become a medium- to 
long-term one instead of an immediate challenge, but it still persists. The 
Vietnamese economic reform and development programs will attract Thailand's 
businessmen-cum-politicians, but the economic benefits cannot replace historical 
rivalry and potential conflict between the two states in the future. Thailand's 
security agencies like the National Security Council will still eye Vietnam as the 
major threat to Thai security. Therefore, China will retain its role as a security 
guarantor subsequently.
In contrast, a cordial relationship between Thailand and China can be 
argued as a natural phenomenon. A benevolent relationship in the past moulded 
the Thai perception into cooperating with China in military affairs with a certain 
degree of confidence. For hundreds of years, Siam and later Thailand accepted 
China's regional role and influence, and Thailand had benefited from such 
friendly relationship. The hostility during the fifties, sixties and early seventies 
was a special case. Thailand would not have become an enemy of China at that 
time if the United States had not provided security protection to Bangkok. The 
Chinese support of the CPT was also a strategy employed to counter the US Cold 
War doctrine and its dominant role in Asia as well as its Asian allies. That was a 
unique situation compared to the former period. The Sino-Thai security 
relationship will not deteriorate in the near future while Thailand has developed its 
ties with Indochina. Thailand will try to maintain a cordial relationship with 
China as long as it is able.
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Thailand's military modernisation programs and the military connection 
between Bangkok and Beijing resulting in new areas of cooperation - arms 
businesses and non-military security programs - necessitate their close defence 
ties. This special relationship will be further intensified when the likely US 
military withdrawal from the Philippines changes the regional balance in the 
future. China will assume an increasing role when its maritime power expands 
vis a vis the declining role of the US. Bangkok might then consider the US as 
irrelevant in providing Thailand security protection. From the Thai perspective, 
the reluctant stance of the US on its military involvement in the region and recent 
trade problems with the Asean countries decrease the US security role 
substantially. Therefore, Thailand will undoubtedly strengthen its security ties 
with Beijing.
For China, the most probable development is that its present foreign 
policy will be maintained, especially in terms of the Sino-Thai and Sino-Asean 
relationships. China has not yet found another Southeast Asian state agreeing to 
establish security cooperation and accepting the Chinese regional role like 
Thailand does. Mutual benefits derived from having close security ties with 
Thailand are likely to dominate China's policy consideration with regard to 
Southeast Asia. In the light of China's growing maritime power, Beijing will 
probably avoid confrontation with the Asean states but its interests in the South 
China Sea will be expressed from time to time.
Nonetheless, the maximum Thai-Chinese security relationship must be 
less than a formal alliance. One reason is that Thailand will not face a major 
immediate threat in the near future and hence, that kind of relationship is 
unnecessary. Another reason is that the current informal security relationship has 
already provided the benefits required by Thailand. The potential conflict in the 
South China Sea between China and some Asean states may also restrain 
Thailand's overt military relationship with Beijing. Thailand will inevitably be 
more cautious in regard to military commitments with China in the longer term.
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There are major restraints which can limit Sino-Thai security ties when 
their mutual interests subside or if future changes in China's politics occur. The 
greatest restraint is that China is still considered as a long-term threat to Thailand. 
This view was expressed by Panya Singsakda, the current secretary to the Prime 
Minister, at a time when he was an Assistant Army Chief-of-Staff that In the 
future, if China and Vietnam cease being adversaries the Thai-Chinese relations 
may become meaningless in Peking's eyes. And Thailand under communism 
may be something more desirable for China.1
This perception will impose restrictions on Thailand's security relationship 
with China when the benefits of alignment with Beijing are in doubt or when there 
is a major change in Chinese politics or its foreign policy. Recent turmoil and 
political instability in China increases this anxiety. It demonstrated Thailand that 
the Thais must be prepared for a sudden change in China's future policy towards 
Southeast Asia.
The domestic turbulence may also make China less credible as a security 
guarantor. China's capacity to implement its policy may be degraded. China's 
decreased credibility may arise even though China will maintain its present foreign 
policy. Long-term military commitments with China may be inappropriate in the 
eyes of the Thai leaders. History also suggests that China always ignored its 
tributary states when faced with internal conflicts and turmoil.
When China changes its attitude toward Thailand, Thailand will once 
again adjust its foreign policy to minimise the China threat. The current security 
cooperation with China reflects the pragmatic Thai foreign policy of 
accommodating with greater powers to pursue common interests while 
temporarily pushing aside future differences. Thailand's reserved response to 
Chinese massacre of the students in Beijing did not imply that Thailand was not 
concerned about the brutal action of the Chinese government. If Bangkok's 
future interest is in conflict with that of Beijing, past friendship will not be an 
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APPENDIX A: US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND 
(in millions of US dollars)
Year FMS ESF MAP IMET Total
1978 29.5 - 7.30 0.96 37.76
1979 30.0 - 1.43 0.86 32.29
1980 36.0 2.0 11.60 0.79 48.39
1981 53.4 2.0 0.35 0.79 54.54
1982 74.7 5.0 4.60 1.42 85.72
1983 76.0 5.0 14.90 1.74 97.64
1984 94.0 5.0 5.12 2.23 106.35
1985* 95.0 5.0 5.00 2.30 107.30
1986 80.5 4.8 4.70 2.20 92.2
1987 - 5.0 50.00 2.34 57.34
1988 23.5 5.0 20.00 2.15 50.65
1989 - 5.0 22.00 2.20 29.20
FMS: Foreign Military Sales credits.
ESF: Economic Support Fund (used to supplement the RTG resources
for assistance programs in areas affected by the influx of refugees 
and Vietnamese military incursions).
MAP: Military Assistance Program.
IMET: International Military Education and Training.
*: Estimated.
Sources: Figures during 1978-85 were collected by Muthiah Alagappa, The
National Security o f Developing States: Lessions from Thailand 
(Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1987) Figures 
dur ing 1986-1989 were co l l ec t ed  by Pornp imol  
Kanchanalak, Bangkok Post, 13 January 1989).
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V. BANKTHAI L AN D
 ^ KAMPUCHEA PHILIPPINES
/  ^  V  VS 0 U(TH 
.C H l ) N A  
S / E A  /
SPRATLY
ISLANDS
V ' S UL U SEA
S A B A H
MALAYSIA
C E L E B E S
AREAS CLAIMED BY MORE THAN ONE COUNTRY
MIDLINES DRAWN WITH ISLAND GROUPS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
MIDLINES DRAWN IGNORING ISLAND GROUPS
BOUNDARY OF HAINAN SPECIAL ADMINISTRATION DISTRICT
P = T h i - t u  and 4 o t h e r  i s l e t s  h e l d  by th e  P h i l i p p i n e s .
R = Reed Bank d r i l l i n g  by a P h i l i p p in e s - S w e d i s h  US ( S ta n d a r d  I n d ia n a )  
c o n s o r t iu m .
T = I t u - a b a  and a few o t h e r  i s l e t s  h e ld  by Taiw an.
V = S p r a t l y  I s .  and 12 o t h e r  i s l e t s  h e l d  by V ie tnam .
Source  : Hungdah Chiu and Choon-Ho P a r k ,  "L e g a l  S t a t u s  o f  th e  P a r a c e l
and S p r a t l y  I s l a n d s " ,  Ocean Development and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law 
J o u r n a l  3 :1  (1 9 7 5 ) .
APPENDIX C: CHINESE MAP SHOWING THE CHINESE CLAIMS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA
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Source : Hasjim Djalal, "Conflicting Territorial and Jurisdictional
Claims in South China Sea", The Indonesian Quarterly 7:1 
(1979).
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APPENDIX D: DISPUTED CLAIMS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE PHILIPPINES
S ource  : Hanns j .  B u c h h o lz ,  Law o f  th e  Sea Zones i n  th e  P a c i f i c  Ocean 
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